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Notes and Comments
Lloyd's of London and Diversity
Jurisdiction: Analyzing the
Citizenship of a Unique Organization
The rules for diversity jurisdiction are straightforward. The
difficulty arises in applying them to Lloyd's of London-that
venerable institution shrouded in the corporate vagaries of
British law.
-Circuit Judge James L. Ryan'
INTRODUCTION
To bring a claim in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332,2 each
plaintiff must prove that he or she is a citizen of a state different
from each defendant.3 Over the years courts have grappled with
1. Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26
F.3d 39, 41 (6th Cir. 1994).
2. 28 U.S.C. section 1332 outlines the requirements for a district court to
properly procure original jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997). In part, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, ex-
clusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; ...
(c) ... (1) a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it
has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business, except that in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or
contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to
which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer
shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as
well as of any State by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the
State where it has its principal place of business; ....
Id.
3. Federal courts have been conferred the power to decide disputes arising
under state laws on the basis that the parties are citizens of different states. See
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the issue of how to define Lloyd's of London's ("Lloyd's") citizenship
status with respect to diversity jurisdiction. Specifically, courts
are uncertain as to whether each member's citizenship 4 should be
considered or only that of the lead, representative member of the
syndicate group.5 Lloyd's access to the federal court system, under
a guise of either a corporate entity or an unincorporated associa-
tion, depends upon how various federal courts interpret Lloyd's or-
ganization. Similarly, each court's decision effects how our
founding fathers' envisioned diversity jurisdiction.
It is not clear whether Lloyd's meets the Federal Code require-
ment of complete diversity. Moreover, it is equivocal whether
Lloyd's is to be considered as either an incorporated or unincorpo-
rated association. Lloyd's appears to be a corporation since it is
made up of individuals who belong to membership groups. 6 These
groups, called syndicates, are members of Lloyd's. Essentially, the
syndicate groups conduct their own business without any liability
id. The power of the federal judiciary to adjudicate "Controversies between two or
more . .. Citizens of different States" is derived from Article III, Section 2 of the
United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.1. Today, the power is stat-
utorily embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which explains that federal courts procure
jurisdiction over diversity of citizenship cases. That is, cases where there is com-
plete diversity in that each defendant is a citizen of a different state than each
plaintiff. See John McCormack, Comment, Carden v. Arkoma Associates: The Citi-
zenship of Limited Partnerships, Associations, and Juridical Entities-A Chilling
Future for Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 27 New Eng. L. Rev. 505, 506 an. 1-3, 5, 6
and accompanying text (1992) (describing some of the history behind the common
law acceptance of the citizenship characterizations of unincorporated
associations).
4. See infra part I.B.1-3, 5 (explaining the membership of Lloyd's and the
compilation of different individuals).
5. See infra part I.B.5 (describing that the lead, representative member is
officially termed an underwriter and acts as an agent for all members of the group
that he represents). The "lead representative" is the underwriting agent who rep-
resents the interests of the entire syndicate group. See Eileen M. Dacey, The
Structure of the Lloyd's Market, 555 PLI/Comm 33, 49 (1990) (explaining the pri-
mary responsibility of the lead underwriter). The group is comprised of "all of the
members represented" which are individuals or corporations. Id. at 37.
6. It would appear to an uninformed outsider that Lloyd's conducts business
as a corporation, considering each syndicate group is usually referred to as Lloyd's.
Furthermore, the individual members of Lloyd's have no power to conduct busi-
ness on their own behalves and must rely on Lloyd's to conduct business for them.
See Gary L. Lockwood, Lloyd's of London: A Primer, 750 PLI Comm 7, 30-41
(1997) (describing the roles of different individuals and particularly emphasizing
that a Name is not allowed to write a risk by herself and therefore must be a
member of a syndicate represented by an underwriter).
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to the "Lloyd's entity."7 Comparatively, Lloyd's also resembles an
unincorporated association because it conducts business similar to
a partnership.8 As stated by a prominent underwriter,9 an appro-
priate way to describe Lloyd's of London is that "[ilndividually we
are underwriters. Collectively we are Lloyd's." 10 These words cor-
rectly characterize Lloyd's, not as an insurance company, but as a
marketplace for those seeking insurance and for those willing to
invest a risk in other's property." As a result, Lloyd's has been
assessed citizenship as both an unincorporated association and a
corporation amongst two different federal circuit courts. 1
2
7. See Adam Raphael, Ultimate Risk: The Inside Story of the Lloyd's Catas-
trophe 42 (1995) (stating that "[ejach Name trades on his own account with unlim-
ited personal liability. That means that he is responsible only for his own share of
losses or profits, not for those of any other member of the syndicate") (emphasis
added). The syndicates are responsible for their own affairs and subscribe to the
policies, or risks, they choose, almost as an individual corporation, because the
underwriting agent for the syndicate binds all of the members to certain insurance
risks. See Dacey, supra note 5, at 49 (1990). The underwriting agent is also re-
sponsible for following the by-laws of Lloyd's (which are similar to the by-laws of a
corporation). See id. The syndicate group is managed by a managing agent. See
id. at 44; see also infra part I.B.2 (explicating a syndicate). However, unlike a
corporation, each member of the syndicate is exposed to unlimited liability. See id.
at 35, 36.
8. See Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900) (denoting
that a partnership is to be defined as an unincorporated association for citizenship
purposes). See also infra part Ii.B.3 (describing what defines an entity as an unin-
corporated association and demonstrating the various entities which have been
historically defined as "unincorporated associations").
9. See Dacey, supra note 5, at 35 n.2 (1990) (attributing the comment to
"Walter Farrant, a 19th Century Caller of the Room," [a Caller is one who would
announce the names of the brokers] (citing Raymond Flower & Michael Wynn
Jones, Lloyd's of London: An Illustrated History 105 (1974)); see also Antony
Brown, Cuthbert Heath: Maker of the Modem Lloyd's of London 50 (1980) [herein-
after Cuthbert Heath] (acknowledging the quote, but failing to attribute it to any-
one in particular by merely saying, "A Lloyd's man once said").
10. Brown, Cuthbert Heath, supra note 9, at 50; Antony Brown, Lloyd's of
London 5 (1974) [hereinafter Lloyd's of London]; Dacey, supra note 5, at 55. Spe-
cifically, this statement sums up the Lloyd's organization because individually the
underwriters insure policies. However, collectively every member of Lloyd's pro-
vides a support system and network for each other. For an example, see Brown,
Lloyd's of London, at 43 (describing a situation in 1906 where one of the underwrit-
ers was unable to pay his debts and thus his debts were charged to every member
of Lloyd's in proportion to the premiums that they wrote).
11. See Theodore A. Boundas et al., Lloyd's and the London Market: Overview
and Recent Developments 766 PLY Comm 7 (1998) (discussing the general princi-
ple that Lloyd's is a marketplace for insurance).
12. For example, the Sixth Circuit holds that the lead underwriter acts as an
agent for undisclosed principals, thus finding that it is proper to only look at the
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This uncertainty is illustrated by the split amongst the Sixth
and Seventh Circuit courts. 13 The issue has also been directly ad-
dressed, with rather consistent conclusions, by a few federal dis-
trict courts.14 The determination of Lloyd's citizenship is a recent
dilemma for the federal courts because in previous cases, the sig-
nificance of the Names' citizenship was not an issue. In these ear-
lier actions, it appeared that "none of the names in the syndicates
that underwrote the policy had the same citizenship as an insured,
so the question could not have arisen."15 Thus, past courts had no
reason to determine if a Lloyd's syndicate should be defined as a
citizenship of the agent. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,
Eng. v. Layne, 26 F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1994). In contrast, the Seventh Circuit holds
that a partnership type arrangement exists, and thus it is proper to look at the
citizenship of all the members which comprise the group as a traditional, unincor-
porated association model. See Indiana Gas Co., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d
314 (7th Cir. 1998).
13. Only the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have had an opportunity to directly
address the determination of citizenship. Compare Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins.
Co., 141 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that a Lloyd's of London insurance syndi-
cate takes on the citizenship of each of its individual subscribing members) with
Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26 F.3d 39 (6th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 339 (1998) (holding that the syndicate group
takes on the citizenship of only the agent representative).
14. See Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Certain Member Companies of the Institute
of London Underwriters, 870 F. Supp. 3 (D. Me. 1994) (finding that the potential
for liability should be the key in determining if a party is a real party in interest);
Humm v. Lombard World Trade, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that all members of the syndicate group had to be considered for diversity jurisdic-
tion purposes); see also Bell & Assocs. v. Lloyd's Underwriters, No. 92 Civ. 5249,
1998 WL 274346 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1998) (holding that the Lloyd's syndicate
group is a citizen of each state where each Name is a citizen); Chase Manhattan
Bank v. Aldridge, 906 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the syndicate is a
citizen of the state or states where each investor (Name) is a citizen); Lowsley-
Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 884 F. Supp. 166 (D.N.J. 1995) (finding that since
the parties stipulated that the Names were personally liable on the policies, they
were real parties in interest); Transamerica Corp. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 884 F.
Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1995) (finding that syndicates are citizens of each state as all of
the Names because the distinction between the active underwriters and Names is
unnecessary).
15. Indiana Gas Co., 141 F.3d at 319; see, e.g., Certain Underwriters of
Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1990);
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 & n.29 (1984);
United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37-38 & n.9 (1952);
R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. FTC, 931 F.2d 430, 433 (7th Cir. 1991); Webster v.
Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925). Each of the cases is cited because each involved
litigation by or against a Lloyd's syndicate in a section 1332 action, yet there was
no reason to discuss the dilemma of diversity of citizenship.
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corporation or an unincorporated association. 16 However, due to
the presence of parties with potentially the same citizenship,
courts have been restricted to ascertaining whether or not the fed-
eral court is a proper forum prior to determining the substantive
issues.
Determining the citizenship of such a unique organization is
difficult for the courts because of contradicting policy issues rang-
ing from a general reluctance to broaden diversity jurisdiction by
judicial definition, 17 balanced against the need for associations to
have access to the federal courts.1s A corporation's citizenship is
defined as that of the state of incorporation and the state in which
it maintains its principal place of business. 19 In contrast, courts
determine the citizenship of unincorporated associations 20 by as-
sessing the citizenship of each of its members because an unincor-
porated association is not a legal, fictional entity like a
corporation.2 1 It is important for courts to decide whether Lloyd's
gains access to the federal courts under the characterization of a
corporation or an unincorporated association because it will set the
precedent on how to define future, complex organizations that force
the same issue.
16. See cases cited supra note 15.
17. See Indiana Gas Co., 141 F.3d at 318.
18. The Supreme Court determined that a corporation should have the ability
to sue and be sued and thus could be deemed a citizen of the state in which it was
chartered. This 1844 decision in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. u.
Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844), overruled the court's earlier decision in Bank
of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), not to confer upon a
corporation a citizenship status on the basis that "[the increased use of the corpo-
rate form as a means of doing business and the desire of corporations to resort to
the federal courts proved inexorable." Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3623, at 590 (2d ed. 1984).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (c)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
supra note 2, for the language of sub-section (c)(1).
20. Unincorporated associations include virtually any other entity that is not
deemed a corporation, such as labor unions, limited and general partnerships and
charitable organizations. See infra part II.B.3 (describing unincorporated associa-
tions and the pertinent citizenship status).
21. See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3630, at 682 (citing United Steelwork-
ers of America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965); Puerto Rico v. Russell &
Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933); Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889)) (highlighting
these as the primary cases which established the basic rule for determining the
citizenship of unincorporated associations); see also infra part II.B.1-3 (highlight-
ing the history of diversity jurisdiction and pointing out the different treatment for
a corporation versus an unincorporated association).
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This Comment analyzes the current methods of establishing
citizenship for Lloyd's and proposes a solution that will provide
some consistency in analyzing and determining the citizenship of
future, complex organizations. Part I provides the history and gen-
eral structure of Lloyd's of London. Part II furnishes an overview
and explanation of diversity jurisdiction. Specifically, this section
examines the parameters of diversity jurisdiction and the manner
in which it has been modified over the years. Part III sets forth
key judicial decisions which highlight the current circuit split re-
garding Lloyd's of London and diversity jurisdiction. Part IV dis-
cusses the primary analysis adopted by the courts and focuses on
the courts' application of an agency theory. This section also dis-
cusses whether Lloyd's constitutes a traditional unincorporated
association for diversity purposes by evaluating which parties are
the appropriate real parties in interest. Specifically, this section
further addresses whether each member of the syndicate group
constitutes a real party or whether only the agent of the syndicate
is a real party. Thereafter, the section applies the diversity juris-
diction rationale to the Lloyd's organization. Finally, this Com-
ment concludes by arguing that since an agency relationship exists
within the Lloyd's syndicate between the underwriter and all of
the Names, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction Lloyd's should be
analyzed according to the common law tradition of unincorporated
associations.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF LLOYD'S
Due to the intricate composition of Lloyd's of London,2 2 courts
have been unable to definitively determine its proper citizenship
for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. Lloyd's of London is
characterized as a unique organization 23 because it is the only or-
ganization of its kind. Its structure confuses the courts since
Lloyd's is associated with insurance, yet it is not an insurance com-
pany and therefore cannot be categorized as such for diversity pur-
22. See infra part I.B.-C. (discussing the different roles within Lloyd's and
demonstrating that Lloyd's is intricate because it is not a traditional corporation,
unincorporated association or insurance company).
23. Lloyd's is often deemed a unique organization because it is organized simi-
lar to a partnership arrangement, although it considers itself to be a corporation.
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poses.24 Rather, Lloyd's portrays itself as a market place for
investor-underwriters and those seeking insurance. 25 Lloyd's is
termed a market place because brokers-those looking for insur-
ance for their clients-use Lloyd's to "shop" for insurance. 26
Individuals known as underwriters are the ultimate insurers
of the insurance policies. 27 These underwriters represent the in-
terests of all the members28 by way of syndicate groups. The syn-
dicates provide virtually any kind of insurance imaginable to just
about anyone who is interested. 29 Members of the syndicate
groups are individual or corporate members who provide all of the
funds to "insure" a particular object, concept or person. 30 As a re-
sult, these underwriters and syndicate groups together make up
the organization known as "Lloyd's of London."
In order to fully appreciate the composition, tradition and
unique character of Lloyd's, it is vital to understand its history.
Furthermore, it is essential to recognize the extent of responsibil-
ity commanded by each position and how each role functions as a
part of the whole. The key players are referred to as the Names,
member agents, syndicates, managing agents, underwriting agent,
following underwriters, the broker and the insured. The following
24. Although the terms "insurance" and "Lloyd's of London" go hand in hand,
Lloyd's does not hold itself out as an insurance company. See Lockwood, supra
note 6, at 11 (stating that "[flor over 300 years, the name of Lloyd's of London has
been synonymous with insurance").
25. For a general synopsis of Lloyd's and the recurring theme that Lloyd's con-
sists of a marketplace for insurance, see Boundas et al., supra note 11, at 9; Lock-
wood, supra note 6, at 11.
26. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 42-43 (describing the broker's obligation to
his client and explaining how the broker uses Lloyd's to subscribe a risk).
27. See Dacey, supra note 5, at 48, 49.
28. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 39-41 (explaining the role of the lead un-
derwriter); Dacey, supra note 5, at 48-49 (describing the responsibilities of the ac-
tive underwriter).
29. For example, Lloyd's insure's specialty risks such as "the on-schedule
opening of the 1964 New York World's Fair; Khrushchev's safety on his 1959 visit
to the United States; Elizabeth Taylor's illness in the filming of 'Cleopatra' .. . ;
Marlene Dietrich's legs and Jimmy Durante's nose against accidental injury; space
missile launchings; and a wide variety of unique risks." David L. Bickelhaupt &
John H. Magee, General Insurance 89 (Davis W. Gregg consulting ed., 8th ed.
1970); see also Flower & Jones, supra note 9, at 161-64 (describing unusual insur-
ance that Lloyd's has issued).
30. See Lloyd's: Business Information: How the Market Works (visited Oct. 11,
1998) <http'//www.lloydsoflondon.co.uk/businfo/hmw/glossary.htm> (describing
who can be a Name); Lockwood, supra note 6, at 30 (explaining, similarly, who can
be a Name and the conditions placed upon them).
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discussion of Lloyd's rich history provides a better familiarization
with each individual position.
A. The Origins of Lloyd's
Lloyd's has an abundant history dating back to the 1600s.
3 1
In seventeenth century England, businessmen conducted their
business in coffee houses. 32 One coffee house in particular-the
coffee house of Edward Lloyd-was a renowned place for those in-
terested in marine insurance.33 Lloyd himself, like the modern
Lloyd's Corporation today,34 was not involved in the activities of
his customers. 35 Rather, he catered to his customers' desires to
partake in an "insurance" industry which revolved around the
shipping and cargo industry by providing a place and the tools to
conduct business. 36
As Lloyd's expanded over the years, it moved into more suita-
ble business space. 37 Although Lloyd's has moved to a bigger
31. For a detailed and informative overview of the history of Lloyd's, see
Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10; Lockwood, supra note 6.
32. The first coffee house was opened in Cornhill, England in 1652 by a man
named Pasqua Rosee. Coffee houses developed around England and became hot
spots for conducting business as a result of their private, comfortable and conve-
nient locales, as compared to the pre-existing taverns and inns. See Brown,
Lloyd's of London, supra note 10, at 14-33 (describing the rise of coffee houses,
especially that of Edward Lloyd, and how they operated as central locales in which
to conduct business); see also Brown, Cuthbert Heath, supra note 9, at 56.
33. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 15, 16 (stating that "[wihile it is assumed
that Edward Lloyd's Coffee House in Tower Street was a place where the under-
writing of marine risks was accomplished, no documentary proof of that has been
uncovered") (emphasis added) (citing Brown & Wormell, An Introduction to Work-
ing in the Lloyd's Market 9 (1987)).
34. The Lloyd's Corporation entity is not involved in the activities of its cus-
tomers because this is the job of the underwriters and syndicates. See infra part
I.C. (describing the role of the Lloyd's Corporation). Thus, the Lloyd's Corporation
merely sees to general management issues and basically provides and maintains
the place so that the business of insurance may be conducted. See id.
35. See supra note 30.
36. See Brown, Cuthbert Heath, supra note 9, at 57; Lockwood, supra note 6,
at 16, 17. Lloyd conducted his business by providing his customers not only with a
place to obtain insurance, but also with details about the arrivals, losses and sales
of ships. See id. Lloyd died in 1713, but his coffee house continued to thrive as his
wealthy individual "customers" carried on the business of marine insurance. See
id. at 18; Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10, at 16.
37. Lloyd's initially moved from Edward Lloyd's coffee house on Tower Street
in the city of London in 1688 to Lombard Street in 1691. In 1774 it obtained a new
premise in Cornhill called the Royal Exchange. In 1928 it moved to a building on
Leadenhall Street. Finally in 1958, it relocated to the Lime Street headquarters,
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building in a more prominent location of town, it still conducts
business in one big "room."38 "Why, might you ask, should Lloyd's
cling to this archaic custom? The point is that now, as in the
1760s, Lloyd's is not an insurance office but a market-the only
place in the world where you can find so many potential insurers in
one room."39 For this reason, Lloyd's continues to conduct business
in a manner which illustrates it's origin.40
The expansion of Lloyd's to the American market occurred
around the 1890s.4 1 Lloyd's decided to venture beyond the confines
of its strictly marine policies in order to conquer the prospering
American market.4 2 Currently, over half of Lloyd's business comes
from the United States.4 3
Notwithstanding the numerous facial changes during its rich
history, the basic purpose and structure of Lloyd's has remained
where the market operates today. For a more illustrative time line of events, see
Lloyd's: Key Dates: Lloyd's in the USA (visited Oct. 11, 1998) <http://www.lloydsof
london.co.uk/lloydsusa>; Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10.
38. See Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10, at 4.
39. Id.
40. For instance, messengers are still called waiters and insurance risks are
placed at the underwriter's box in the Room. The terms "box" and "room" signify
the division of pews or benches used in the coffee house which was generally one
large room. See id.
41. See id. at 68. In 1906, the American market was quickly impressed with
Lloyd's following a mass of insurance claims from a San Francisco earthquake
which destroyed approximately 30,000 houses and 500 city blocks. See id. at 69.
Lloyd's did not disappoint the insured; the respective underwriters collectively
paid the $100,000,000 guaranteed on the insurance risk. See id. at 68-69. The
houses and buildings that were destroyed were a result of the earthquake and fires
which were a ramification of the earthquakes. This was a notable event because
many of the insurance companies were repudiating their liability if the fires con-
nected to the earthquake at all. Lloyd's, however, did not. See id. at 69. "It was,
one might say, the moment of truth. Lloyd's had not merely survived it, but cre-
ated a new and massive goodwill for the future." Id.
42. Towards the end of the 1800's, Lloyd's took on the underwriting of its first
non-marine policy. See Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10, at 66-68. Cur-
rently it underwrites five main classes of business: marine, non-marine, aviation,
motor and term-life. See supra note 30; Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10,
at 66-68 (describing the initial exploration into a non-marine market); Brown,
Cuthbert Heath, supra note 9, at 68-95 (explaining the exploration into a non-
marine market and some history regarding the man attributed with that venture).
43. See supra note 37. Premiums in the form of United States dollars, as op-
posed to English pounds, are kept in the American Trust Fund in New York. See
id. In 1998, the fund was at a level of about ten billion dollars. See id.
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intact.44 As a result, it is still said "that now, as in the 1760's,
Lloyd's is not an insurance office but a market .... ."45 But, in order
to better understand Lloyd's, it is important to grasp the roles and
responsibilities of the key players.
B. Significant Terms
Primarily, Lloyd's is unique because of its organizational
structure. Within this structure there are several significant posi-
tions which form a part of Lloyd's. In determining its citizenship,
courts have been particularly attentive to the extent to which each
member, in her respective capacity, contributes to and is responsi-
ble for Lloyd's business. Accordingly, this section explores the re-
quirements, obligations and duties of the Names, underwriters,
syndicate groups, managing agent, broker and lead underwriters.
1. Names
The Names are responsible for contributing all of the funding
to the syndicate. 46 This financial backing enables the syndicate to
take the risks it chooses.47 A Name may either be a corporation 48
or an individual.49 Lloyd's requires each Name to pay an entrance
44. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (referring to the physical
location changes, the official entry into an insurance market and the progression
into non-marine markets).
45. Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10, at 4.
46. See id. at 34-62 (explaining the concept of unlimited liability to which all
Names are subject); Dacey, supra note 7, at 35, 36 (noting that each member is
individually liable "in theory down to the last penny for losses."); Lockwood, supra
note 6, at 30 (explaining that "[tihe Names ... are the ultimate risk takers").
47. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 30; supra note 30; see also Brown, Lloyd's
of London, supra note 10, at 40 (describing that the amount of business an under-
writer may underwrite is corollary to the amount of funds that the Names
provide).
48. The first corporate members were admitted in 1994 and unlike individual
members, they trade with limited liability. In 1998, there were 435 members who
provided limited liability funds. This constituted 60% of the market. See Lloyd's:
Business Information: Key Facts: Fact Sheets (visited Oct. 11, 1998) <http:I/www.
lloyd.com/businfo/keyfacts/factsheet./membership.htm>.
49. The individual members consist of men and women. Women were initially
welcomed as Names in 1969. There were 6,825 individual members in 1998, which
constituted forty percent of the market. See id. See also Flower & Jones, supra
note 9, at 186 (providing a time line of important dates in the history of Lloyd's).
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fee,50 which is comprised of thirty-two and a half percent to fifty
percent 5 ' of the Name's premium underwriting limit.52
To become a Name, one must subscribe to rigid membership
prerequisites. First, although "membership of Lloyd's is by no
means an upper-class preserve," 3 a minimum level of capital is
required to become a Name. 4 Second, Names must apply and si-
multaneously be sponsored by two current members.6 6 Third, a
mean's test is conducted to assess the candidate's financial situa-
tion.6 6 Under the mean's test, a prospective member must demon-
strate to the committee of Lloyd's that he possesses the necessary
capital-the means-to be a member.57 Lloyd's currently requires
each individual member to show a minimum level of personal
wealth of £250,000 ($412,500).58
Provided that the candidate satisfies the requirements of the
mean's test, the candidate is then asked to come before the Rota
Committee 59 for an interview. Upon successful completion of the
interview, the candidate's application and all other pertinent infor-
mation is circulated for a vote.60 Lloyd's grants admission contin-
50. Considering each Name has unlimited liability, an entrance fee (deposit)
is required to ensure that a member cannot be deemed insolvent. See Brown,
Lloyd's of London, supra note 10, at 38-40.
51. See supra note 48 (noting that the individual will be required to deposit
thirty-five percent in 1999 and forty percent in 2000).
52. See Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10, at 39-40 (explaining that an
underwriter only has the capacity to subscribe to risks in accordance with the capi-
tal provided by his Names. Thus, an underwriter would not be allowed to under-
write a risk for one million dollars if the syndicate only had $500,000 of capital).
Therefore, an underwriter's "premium underwriting limit" could constantly fluctu-
ate according to the financial situation of the syndicate. See id.
53. See id. at 54.
54. See id. at 48.
55. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 30.
56. See Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10, at 47, 48; Lockwood, supra
note 6, at 31.
57. See Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10, at 48.
58. See supra note 48. This amount will be increased over time to £350,000
($577,500) in 2002. See id.
59. See Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10, at 34. "The object of the Rota
Committee is to make a final check on the credential of anyone who is applying to
join a syndicate." Id. The Rota Committee is comprised of three or four members
of the Lloyd's Council. See Raphael, supra note 7, at 38. One author, Adam
Raphael, characterizes the interview before the Rota Committee as "nothing more
than an empty ceremony" where the name was asked "if he appreciated the risk of
unlimited liability that he was undertaking." Id.
60. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 31.
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gent upon unanimous support.6 1 Therefore, if all voting members
support the application, then admission is granted.
These strict membership conditions are necessary to uphold
the tradition of Lloyd's,62 as well as to assure that those interested
in membership have the capital to which they attest.63 The capital
requirement is crucial in light of the unlimited liability of Lloyd's
members.64 Once accorded the Name status, a yearly solvency test
(an audit) is conducted to assure that the Name has maintained
sufficient assets.65
A Name is initially represented by a member agent 66 who aids
the Name in choosing syndicates and looks after the Name's inter-
ests. 67 As will be explained later, Names' interests are repre-
sented by agents called underwriters. Names, therefore, have
neither the power nor the authority to underwrite insurance risks
61. See id. (citing Lloyd's Training Centre, An Introduction to Lloyd's Market
Procedures and Practices 41 (1987)).
62. Strict membership prerequisites uphold Lloyd's tradition to set high stan-
dards for its members to assure that the syndicates will pay, if possible, on the
claims it underwrites so that one member cannot entirely separate himself from
liability as a result of being declared insolvent. See generally Brown, Lloyd's of
London, supra note 10, at 34-62 (explaining the concept of unlimited liability and
describing, in part, the traditional reasons for Lloyd's manner of conducting busi-
ness today).
63. The "tradition" refers to the high quality of work and guarantee that
Lloyd's is known for as well as it's reputation in regards to the risks it underwrites
and the subsequent claims it pays. See id.
64. See id. at 34-62 (explaining that unlimited liability within Lloyd's refers to
the underwriter's obligation to pay on his losses. As a result, if an underwriter
incurs a loss, each Name comprising the syndicate is obligated to pay what she
subscribes and beyond if the syndicate still cannot meet it's obligation under the
claim).
65. The yearly solvency test is performed by an independent auditor. See
Lockwood, supra note 6, at 33. An audit is used to detect the strength of the finan-
cial structure of a syndicate. See id. The audit is essential because each member
subscribes under a policy of unlimited liability. Therefore, the test assures that
members are maintaining the requisite minimum level of wealth. See Brown,
Lloyd's of London, supra note 10, at 40-41 (describing the inception of the audit
system in 1909).
66. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 35 (explaining that "[a] Member's Agent is
an organization picked by a Name to control the Name's affairs as they relate to
business conducted at Lloyd's"); see also supra note 30 (explaining that a Member's
Agent only advises individual Names and that corporate Names are guided by "li-
censed Lloyd's advisers").
67. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 35 (explaining that the Member's Agents
are responsible for overseeing every aspect of the Name's duties and choices; from
guiding the Name through his or her annual insolvency test to advising them
which syndicates to join).
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on their own. Names, with the exception of the actual underwriter,
are not involved in the actual business of writing the policies or
paying the claims. However, their personal wealth is what secures
the policy.As
2. The Syndicate
Subsequent to becoming a Name, the Name must subscribe to
one or a number of syndicates. 69 The syndicate-a group of Names
which subscribe to a certain risk--ensures that an insurance risk
can be absorbed by an entire group rather than a select few. 70 In
1999, one hundred and thirty-nine syndicates existed.71 The syn-
dicate is governed by a managing agent who oversees the syndi-
cate's general business by keeping its books and paying claims.7 2
Additionally, the syndicate is linked to each Name by way of the
member agent, who advises the individual Names of their
commitments.7 3
68. Individual, unlimited liability is the concept behind Lloyd's syndicates.
See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text, which explain the requirements to
become a Name and how the capital provided for by the Names establishes the
syndicate's overall subscription level. See Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10,
at 34-62 (explaining the concept of the Names' unlimited liability); Dacey, supra
note 7, at 35, 36 (noting that each member is individually liable "in theory down to
the last penny for losses"); Lockwood, supra note 6, at 30 (explaining that "[tihe
Names ... are the ultimate risk takers").
69. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 34.
70. See Dacey, supra note 7, at 37 (describing the establishment of syndicates
and noting that "[tihe first 'big' syndicate was formed in the 1870's by F.W.
Marten").
71. See Lloyd's: Directory: Governance (visited Aug. 31, 1999) <http://www.
lloydsoflondon.co.uk/directory/underwriters/body.htm>.
72. See id. In 1999 there were sixty-three managing agents operating in the
Lloyd's market. See id. The Managing Agent takes care of all of the tasks of run-
ning a syndicate. See id. See also Lockwood, supra note 6, at 36-38 (describing
that one of the key functions of a managing agent is to appoint an active under-
writer to underwrite on behalf of the syndicate); Dacey, supra note 7, at 44-46
(describing that some of the other tasks of the managing agent are to invest the
syndicates premium, appoint the active underwriter, pay claims, maintain all of
the associated accounting and generally manage the syndicate).
73. See supra note 30.
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3. Underwriters
Underwriters, who are usually professional underwriters,
7 4
are appointed by the managing agent.v5 An underwriter acts as an
agent for the Names by underwriting a policy on behalf of all of the
Names belonging to a specific syndicate. 76 Underwriters have a
blanket consent by the syndicate group to act in its best interests
and thus to enter into "contracts" (insurance risks) on its behalf 77
It is not a requirement that the professional underwriter be a
Name.7 The role of the underwriter, therefore, is that of an em-
ployee of the managing agent.79 The underwriter is the actual in-
surer because he is also responsible for the unlimited liability of
the syndicate's losses, has the full power to bind all of the Names
and may bring litigation on their behalf,80 Therefore, the under-
writer, not the Lloyd's Corporation, is deemed the insurer.8 ' As
will be explained, the Lloyd's Corporation simply provides the mar-
ket place and the means for people to come together to conduct the
business of insurance.8 2
4. Brokers
The broker acts as the link between the insured and the un-
derwriter.83 A broker's primary responsibility is to represent
Lloyd's customers. A broker is a necessary participant because
Lloyd's will not contract with insurance companies or individuals
directly.84 Lloyd's requires that a risk8 5 be placed by an accredited
74. See id. (noting that the underwriter is a professional because of her spe-
cific expertise of the syndicate group's primary risks. The market, therefore, de-
pends upon these people).
75. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 38, 39.
76. See supra note 30
77. See Dacey, supra note 7, at 48, 49 (explaining that the primary responsi-
bility of the active underwriter is to represent the syndicate members); see also
Lockwood, supra note 6, at 34, 40-41 (describing the relationship between the
Name and underwriter within the syndicate and noting that a single risk is gener-
ally shared amongst many syndicates).
78. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 38.
79. See id.
80. See Dacey, supra note 7, at 48, 49.
81. See id. at 49, 50.
82. See infra part I.C. (explaining the inception and role of the Lloyd's
Corporation).
83. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 42.
84. See id. at 41.
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brokerage firm.8 6 Currently, there are more than 200 firms regis-
tered as Lloyd's brokers.87 They range in size from small specialist
companies to large multinational groups.88 The broker's responsi-
bility is to place risks wherever she deems appropriate, either at
Lloyd's or elsewhere.8 9 The broker has an obligation to prepare a
slip-which represents the precise risk to be insured-for the pol-
icy holder and present it to the underwriter9 ° A broker who is
attempting to insure a policy through Lloyd's may often find that it
is not possible to have the risk subscribed to by only one group of
syndicates. 91 In fact, "[a] typical policy will be placed with about
twenty underwriters who will each write a small percentage of the
risk."92 As a result, the broker may have to go to numerous syndi-
cates within Lloyd's, or even solicit to insurance companies outside
of Lloyd's, in order to have his risk insured one hundred percent.93
Consequently, if there is more than one syndicate subscribing to a
particular policy, then the underwriters on that policy are organ-
ized as the leading underwriter and a series of following
underwriters. 94
85. See Facing the Future's Risks (Lyman Bryson ed., 1953), reprinted in Risk
and Insurance 1, 1-18 (Ralph H. Blanchard ed., 1965) (explaining that insurance
originated because individuals and organizations were unwilling to bear the risk of
loss. Therefore they paid others to take the risks. A risk is an uncertainty of the
future in which a chance is taken).
86. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 41.
87. See supra note 30.
88. See id.
89. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 42. It may be impossible or impractical for
the Broker to have his risk 100% subscribed at Lloyd's and thus may find it neces-
sary to venture outside of the house of Lloyd's for additional insurance.
90. See Raphael, supra note 7, at 42.
91. This is the reason for a system of a lead underwriter and following under-
writers as explained in Section I.B.5. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 39-41 (ex-
plaining the system of lead underwriters and the involvement of numerous
syndicates on a single risk).
92. Raphael, supra note 7, at 42. The underwriters each represent a different
syndicate.
93. See supra note 37, at "Brokers"; Lockwood, supra note 6, at 42. It is the
Broker's responsibility to solicit any and all underwriters to have his risk one hun-
dred percent insured. See Raphael, supra note 6, at 42.
94. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 41.
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5. Lead Underwriters
The leading underwriter is the first to subscribe to the risk,
and consequently, he negotiates its terms and conditions.95 Each
underwriter may subscribe a percentage of the risk with which he
feels comfortable. 96 If subsequent underwriters agree to the
terms, then they may also subscribe a percentage as a following
underwriter. 97 The underwriters are ultimately responsible for
the amount of liability to which they each subscribe to on behalf of
their syndicates. 98
C. The Lloyd's Act of 1982 and the Council of Lloyd's
A notable aspect of the Names, underwriters, syndicates and
other significant positions, is that they had no existence or legiti-
macy beyond the coffee house until 1771 when the Society of
Lloyd's was formed.99 However, the Corporation of Lloyd's, or the
Society of Lloyd's Underwriters, was only incorporated by an Act of
Parliament in 1871.100 The Corporation's function is similar to the
organization that Edward Lloyd started as a place to conduct busi-
ness.' 0 1 Some of the Corporation's primary functions are that it
"owns and maintains the Lloyd's building, rents out boxes, attends
to physical security at the Room 10 2 and issues publications of com-
95. See id. at 40.
96. See Dacey, supra note 7, at 49.
97. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 41.
98. See Dacey, supra note 7, at 35.
99. See Flower & Jones, supra note 9, at 57 (illustrating action on the part of
seventy-nine underwriters and brokers who subscribed £100 each to form the Soci-
ety of Lloyd's, which in turn enabled them to move to their own building as an
organization).
100. See supra note 37; Lockwood, supra note 6, at 23; Brown, Lloyd's of
London, supra note 10, at 99.
101. The Corporation function resembles that of Edward Lloyd's because it is
not active in any of the actual insurance of Lloyd's. Similarly, the Corporation
merely exists to oversee general day to day management. See Dacey, supra note 7,
at 49, 50.
102. The "Room" is one large, open space unobstructed by any barriers in which
all of Lloyd's syndicates conduct business. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 29. See
also Brown, Lloyd's of London, supra note 10, at 3-13 (describing the history and
background of the Room and indicating that
[oiriginally the Room was part of a coffee house in seventeenth-century
London. Today it is roughly the size of the Concorde's hangar, air-condi-
tioned, sound-proofed and equipped with every modern aid. Yet in es-
sence it has not changed. If you go into the Room today you will still see
what happened at Lloyd's in the seventeenth century).
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mon interest to the market." 0 3 Essentially, the Corporation has
more of an administrative function because it is responsible for
most of the management issues, rather than the day to day activi-
ties of Lloyd's customers. Although the Lloyd's Corporation itself
is incorporated, the Lloyd's of London organization is a separate
entity consisting of unincorporated syndicate groups and
individuals. o4
Subsequently, the Lloyd's Act of 1982105 granted authority to
the Council of Lloyd's to govern the Society of Lloyd's Underwrit-
ers. 10 6 The Council is comprised of twenty-eight members, twelve
of which are working Names, who are responsible for electing the
Chairman. 0 7 The Council of Lloyd's accomplishes the goal of self-
regulation.10 8 In order to effectuate this goal, "the Council has en-
acted by-laws on administrative suspension, among other things,
(permitting it to suspend any member, broker, underwriting agent
or any employee of an underwriting agent) from doing business at
Lloyd's for six months or more, as warranted."10 9 Thus, Schedule 2
of the Lloyd's Act of 1982 assigns to the Council the tasks of "man-
agement and superintendence of the affairs of the Society and the
power to regulate and direct the business of insurance at
Lloyd's."1 10 It is therefore evident that Lloyd's has an expansive
history, and a subsequent intricate composition, which distin-
guishes it as a marketplace for insurance as opposed to an insur-
ance company in general.
The history of Lloyd's demonstrates that although it is com-
monly referred to as one single entity which conducts its own in-
Id. at 3-4.
103. See Dacey, supra note 7, at 50.
104. See id. at 49, 50 (explaining the function of the Corporation of Lloyd's and
emphasizing that Lloyd's and the Corporation of Lloyd's are distinctly different
because the insurance business of Lloyd's is written by individuals-not a corpora-
tion. Dacey also notes that there is an effort to maintain two separate entities
because "[nlo Corporation employee (or their relative) can be a member of
Lloyd's"). Id. at 50.
105. This was "a private act of Parliament which was intended to set the frame-
work for Lloyd's self-regulation." Id. at 46. See also Lockwood, supra note 6, at 24-
25 (explaining the role and functions of the Council of Lloyd's as a result of the
Lloyd's Act).
106. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 24.
107. See Dacey, supra note 7, at 47.
108. See supra note 30; Lockwood, supra note 6, at 24.
109. Dacey, supra note 7, at 46.
110. Lloyd's Act of 1982, Schedule 2.
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suring business, it is actually an organization comprised of
numerous smaller entities known as syndicates. These syndicates
are composed of individuals, or Names, who provide all of the risk
capital. Consequently, each syndicate is completely and separately
liable for any risk to which it subscribes. Therefore, Lloyd's as an
organization is unaffected by each syndicate's unlimited exposure
to risks.
Moreover, an examination of Lloyd's history reveals a signifi-
cant emphasis on tradition. This fact suggests, with some cer-
tainty, that the structure of Lloyd's may never change. Thus,
when analyzing diversity jurisdiction and Lloyd's, one must con-
sider our founding father's intentions, as well as the narrow expan-
sions that have been made to the diversity jurisdiction rule over
the years.
II. OVERVIEW OF DIVERsITY JURISDICTION
A brief overview of the history of diversity jurisdiction high-
lights the policy reasons for the different citizenship rules that ap-
ply to individuals, corporations, unincorporated associations and
various other entities when determining diversity jurisdiction. Ar-
ticle III, section 2 of the United States Constitution gives the fed-
eral courts the power to maintain jurisdiction over specific cases
and controversies."' As a result, a federal court may hear a case if
it procures both personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject
matter jurisdiction over the case or controversy. 112 Subject matter
111. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;- to all Cases affect-
ing Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of ad-
miralty and maritime Jurisdiction;- to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citi-
zens of different States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Land under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
112. See supra note 120, at 18 (citing art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion which confers subject matter jurisdiction to the federal judiciary). The federal
judiciary power is statutorily granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994 & Supp. III 1997):
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
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jurisdiction provides two primary ways by which parties gain ac-
cess to the federal courts: (1) a federal question in controversy 1 3 or
(2) diversity of citizenship. 114 The presence of a federal question is
a relatively simple principle to apply and, as a result, has not been
the source of much controversy." 5 However, courts have encoun-
tered increased difficulty in discerning whether diversity exists
with unprecedented entities such as Lloyd's."16
A. Emergence and Purpose of Diversity Jurisdiction
The Judiciary Act of 1789117 represents the first time that
Congress exercised its power to define diversity jurisdiction. 118
Under the Act, Congress declared that the federal courts had the
power to hear cases between citizens of different states. 119 Diver-
sity jurisdiction was primarily adopted by Congress to provide a
113. See id.
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997). Of course, once litigation is
already pending, the federal court may also obtain or maintain jurisdiction over
matters by way of supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994)) or removal
(28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994)).
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See also Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908) (establishing that it is not suffi-
cient for the plaintiff to allege, as a federal question, that an anticipated defense by
the defendant is unconstitutional, but must assert an issue based on federal law or
the Constitution within his cause of action); Merrell Dow v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804 (1986) (providing that a cause of action brought under a federal statute may
not confer jurisdiction to a federal court if the statute does not provide for a private
cause of action).
116. See McCormack, supra note 3, at 514 (noting that the identification or defi-
nition of citizenship for corporations and unincorporated associations is obscure
and controversial).
117. Judiciary Acts are acts in which Congress establishes inferior federal
courts and/ or adds or defines the scope of federal court jurisdiction. See Black's
Law Dictionary 850 (6th ed. 1990). Congress has the power to establish inferior
federal courts and define their powers pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. See id. The Judiciary Act of 1789 was the first time that Congress invoked
this power. See id.
118. See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3602, at 364.
119. See McCormack, supra note 3, at 512. The extent of Congress' action and
the scope of jurisdiction that was granted is embodied in 28 U.S.C. section 1332.
Note that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, two prongs must be met to have proper
diversity of citizenship: an amount in excess of $75,000 and complete diversity of
citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997) (outlining the require-
ments for the federal courts to properly hear diversity of citizenship cases).
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forum of fairness for citizens who felt they could be discriminated
against if forced into a state court of the opposing party.120
The federal courts were designed as courts of limited jurisdic-
tion and therefore, the embodiment of federal diversity jurisdiction
was similarly intended to have a limited scope. 121 As a result, the
term "citizen," within the requirement of "complete diversity of cit-
izenship," has been the subject of much contention. Accordingly,
the definition of citizen, as it applies to Lloyd's, is determinative of
whether Lloyd's is properly characterized as an unincorporated as-
sociation or a corporation.
B. Evolution of the Term "Citizen"
Although diversity jurisdiction was provided for within the
United States Constitution and the Federal Judiciary Code, it re-
mains ambivalent as to what qualifies one to be a "citizen." As a
result, the federal courts have been left to decide the meaning of
the term "citizen" and the assessment of citizenship has thus been
a specific area of dispute when determining whether parties are
citizens of different states. 22 Therefore, a proper citizenship as-
sessment of Lloyd's depends upon an analysis of how courts have
interpreted the meaning of "citizen."
120. "The primary purpose of federal jurisdiction over disputes between citi-
zens of different states is to provide a neutral forum for out-of-state parties who
fear that they will be subjected to local prejudice if forced to litigate as strangers in
a state court." Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3611, at 509 (emphasis added). A
"fair forum" means that citizens of different states are provided a neutral forum in
which to litigate their matter so that an out of state citizen may not have to fear
being subjected to local prejudice. See id. The corporation was given a legal fiction
because: 1) it is impractical and burdensome on the court to have to bring into
court every possible person who comprises the corporation, 2) to allow individuals
to sue corporate entities without unnecessary hardships, and 3) to give corpora-
tions a fair forum in which to litigate. See McCormack, supra note 3, at 516-19.
See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3601, at 338 (citing James Madison as an advo-
cate for vesting the federal courts with diversity jurisdiction on a basis of being a
fair forum. Reprinted in 3 Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 486 (1836));
see also id. § 3611, at 509; § 3602, at 364.
121. See id., § 3602, at 371 (citing Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
303 (1809); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) 126 (1804); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Hale v. McCall, 425 F. Supp. 396 (E.D.
Tenn. 1976)).
122. See id. § 3611, at 507. Ultimately Congress may ratify any judicial deci-
sions which affect the definition of the term "citizenship." If Congress does choose
to adopt any judicial interpretations, it would reflect this in a statute or by way of
an amendment to a statute.
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1. Complete Diversity Requirement
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to expand diversity
jurisdiction beyond its legislatively intended limited scope,'12 3
thereby keeping the definition of "citizen" rather narrow. 124 The
reason for restricting availability to the federal forum is to mini-
mize injustice for out-of-state litigants in state court and to pre-
vent congestion in the federal court system.125 This policy was
reflected in the 1806 decision in Strawbridge v. Curtiss,'26 where
the Supreme Court held that there must be complete diversity12 7
between all plaintiffs and all defendants. 128 This decision effec-
tively limited a "natural person's" 129 access to the federal courts by
requiring each party with an interest in the litigation to be a citi-
zen of a different state than all opposing parties.130 The Straw-
123. Diversity jurisdiction has a limited scope because Congress intended for
federal jurisdiction to extend only to citizens who maintain a complete diversity.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988 & Supp. III 1997). This limitation of complete diversity
is exemplified by the judicial reluctance to grant unincorporated associations any
sort of citizenship in the composite (like a corporation) which would increase their
chances of complete diversity. For an illustration, see infra nn. 160-69 and accom-
panying text, describing the general rule regarding unincorporated associations
and which entities fall into this category.
124. See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3605, at 397-408 (describing complete
diversity in general).
125. See Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure 23-27 (2d ed. 1993).
126. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
127. Complete diversity means that no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same
state as any of the defendants. See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3605, at 397
(noting that as established by the Constitution and the Judicial Code, it is not
necessary for all the parties on one side of an action to be citizens of different
states).
128. See id.
129. Courts have debated exactly what distinguishes one as a natural person
and
Itihe result has been the evolution by the courts of the following tests for
determining the citizenship of natural persons: (1) a person is considered
a citizen of a state if that person is domiciled within that state and is a
citizen of the United States; (2) a person is considered a citizen or subject
of a foreign nation if he or she is accorded that status by the laws or gov-
ernment of that country.
Id. § 3611, at 507-09 (citations omitted).
130. See Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267-68. The Supreme Court re-
quires those with a substantive right in the litigation to be joined as a party. The
Court has also held that nominal or formal parties are to be ignored in diversity
determinations. See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3606, at 408-09 (citing Navarro
Savings Ass'n. v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980); Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Fi-
nance Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924)).
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bridge decision, however, left many questions unanswered, such as
how the diversity requirement would apply to citizens who were
not natural persons. Therefore, in subsequent decisions the Court
was forced to decide diversity issues in the context of corporations,
associations and other similar, artificial entities.
2. The Emergence of Corporations as Citizens
The Supreme Court's first opportunity to address whether di-
versity jurisdiction should apply to corporations and whether or
not corporations should be treated as citizens was in 1809 in Bank
of the United States v. Deveaux. 131 In Deveaux, the Supreme Court
held that corporations are not citizens in their own right,132 and
thus, one must look at the citizenship of each individual member to
determine whether diversity jurisdiction exists. 133 Deveaux in-
volved an incorporated bank which brought suit against two indi-
viduals for trespass and conversion.134 The suit was brought in
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 135 The bank al-
leged diversity, arguing that because it was incorporated in Penn-
sylvania, it was a citizen of that state, and thus, diversity existed
because all defendants were citizens of the State of Georgia. 13 6 In
short, the bank argued that as a corporation, it was an aggregate
body with the ability to sue.137 Ultimately, the court determined
that a corporation does not have "faculties of law" to have the abil-
ity to sue or be sued as an aggregate. 138 The bank, therefore, could
not qualify as a citizen of its place of incorporation, but instead
needed to bring suit as a series of individuals who represented and
embodied the bank.
Over the next twenty five years, the existence and importance
of corporations increased tremendously. 39 As a result, in Louis-
131. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
132. The court came to the conclusion that a corporation was not a citizen in its
own right because it was a mere legal entity which was not a citizen, and that in
reality, a suit by a corporation was a suit by its members. See id. at 86.
133. See id. at 67 (describing that "the corporation should be considered as com-
posed of natural persons").
134. See id. at 62.
135. See id. at 63.
136. See id. at 62.
137. See 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 62 (1809).
138. See id. at 64.
139. See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3623, at 590 (noting that the corpora-
tion was an increasingly popular method of conducting business and thus the need
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ville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson,140 the
Supreme Court validated the need for corporations to access the
federal courts by granting them their own distinct citizenship sta-
tus.14 1 In Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Co., Let-
son, a citizen of New York, brought a breach of contract action
against the corporate defendant in a South Carolina federal
court. 142 Members of the corporation were citizens of New York,
North Carolina and South Carolina.143 The plaintiff prevailed and
the defendant appealed on the basis that the lower court did not
properly procure jurisdiction over the case.14 4 Essentially, the de-
fendant argued that there was no diversity because certain mem-
bers of the corporation were citizens of the same state as the
defendant. 145 However, the Court determined that diversity ex-
isted because the corporation existed as a fictitious person.146 The
Court found the defendant to be a citizen of South Carolina, rea-
soning that if the corporation is recognized by the state in which it
is incorporated, then it is to be deemed a person that can sue and
be sued.147 In sum, the Court chose to treat the corporation as an
"artificial person" because 1) the corporation is capable of acting
like a natural person 148 and 2) the purpose of a corporation "is to
bestow the character and properties of individuality on a collective
and changing body of men."149
of corporations to access the federal courts was similarly enhanced because "[tihe
necessities and conveniences of trade and business require that such numerous
associates and stockholders should act by representation, and have faculty of con-
tracting, suing, and being sued in a fictitious or collective name").
140. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
141. See id. at 497 (overruling Deveaux and holding that a corporation is to be
deemed a citizen of the state where it is chartered for the purpose of suing and
being sued).
142. See id. at 498.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 498-99.
145. See id. at 499.
146. See Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 497, 499 (1844). The "fiction" applied to the corporation because the Court
recognized it as an "artificial being" for the purpose of suing and being sued. See
id. at 555.
147. See id. at 558.
148. See id. The Court was specifically referring to the fact that a corporation,
like a natural person, can enter into contracts, manage its own affairs and own and
convey property. See id.
149. Id.
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Congress statutorily codified the Letson holding when it chose
to reorganize the Judicial Code in 1958 by adding subsection (c) to
28 U.S.C. § 1332.150 The subsection states that "a corporation is
rendered a citizen of both its state of incorporation and the state in
which it maintains its principal place of business."151 Therefore,
although the corporation has greater access to the federal courts, it
is potentially a citizen of more than one state.
Subsection (c) was amended again in 1964 to address the un-
certainty of insurers. 152 The amendment addressed a loophole
which existed prior to that time, regarding the citizenship of insur-
ers where some states had adopted legislation which enabled an
action to be brought against the insurer without including the in-
sured. 153 As a consequence, these state statutes allowed parties
greater access to the federal courts by not defeating diversity of
citizenship. The federal government chose to echo the state con-
cerns when amending subsection (c) again in 1964. The effect of
the amendment to subsection (c), therefore, is that insurance com-
panies may be citizens of at least three different states: 54 "the
State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State by
which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State where it
has its principal place of business . . . ."155 In sum, this amend-
ment improved the law because it brought 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) back
in line with its legislative intent-for the federal courts to be fo-
rums of limited access. 156
These amendments 157 illustrate the extent to which Congress
has been willing to expand the definition of "citizen" and how it has
chosen to specifically address and define the citizenship of distinct
150. See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3601, at 336 (noting that a corporation
is a citizen of both its state of incorporation and the state where it maintains its
principal place of business); see also supra note 2 (providing the language of 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
152. See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3601, at 336.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (cX1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
156. Lloyd's does not fall into the category of an insurer under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(c) because Lloyd's is not an insurance company, but a market place for insurance.
See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
157. The Code was amended one final time by the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976, in order to address the issue of a foreign state suing a United
States citizen. See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3601, at 336. Subsection (a)(4) of
28 U.S.C. § 1332 states: "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction ...
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groups. Furthermore, the amendments demonstrate that legisla-
tive action is the proper means by which diversity of citizenship
and diversity jurisdiction should be defined.
3. The Citizenship of Unincorporated Associations
Due to the reluctance of the courts and Congress to expand
diversity jurisdiction, unincorporated associations have not been
given their own citizenship status. Throughout history, virtually
all other forms of organizations, besides corporations and insur-
ance companies, have been aligned as unincorporated associa-
tions.158 The general rule is that the citizenship of unincorporated
associations is determined by the citizenship of each of its individ-
ual members. 159 This rule has been applied to labor unions, 160
joint stock associations, 16 1 insurance associations or exchanges, 162
partnerships, 163 limited partnerships,' M joint ventures,165 reli-
gious or charitable organizations 16 and a governing board of an
unincorporated association. 167
Unincorporated associations are distinguished from corpora-
tions because "[glenerally, these business organizations share the
following characteristics: unified membership, no corporate-like
between ... a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(4) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
158. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
159. See Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889) (being the first case to ad-
dress specifically the issue of an unincorporated association suing in federal court
under one citizenship. The court dismissed the case from federal court on the basis
that is was a joint stock company (thus a partnership) and without evidence of
citizenship of all it's members, it had no right to bring suit in federal court without
a diversity of all its members, unless it was a corporation with diversity). See id.
at 682; see also United Steelworkers of America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S.
145 (1965) (finding that an unincorporated labor union could not be its own juridi-
cal entity unless Congress first declares it as such).
160. See United Steelworkers of America, 382 U.S. at 153.
161. See Chapman, 129 U.S. at 679.
162. See Truck Ins. Exchange v. Dow Chem. Co., 331 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Mo.
1971).
163. See Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
164. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
165. See Universal Steel & Metal Co. v. Railco, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 7 (D. Vt.
1978) (treating a partnership and joint venture as unincorporated associations).
166. See Lawson v. United House of Prayer for all People of the Church on the
Rock of the Apostolic Faith, 252 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
167. See Thomas v. Board of Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207
(1904).
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statutory birth, and no limitations on liability for a certain seg-
ment of its membership."168 Courts find it necessary to define the
citizenship of unincorporated associations differently because "sig-
nificant disadvantages exist in treating an unincorporated associa-
tion in the same manner as a corporation for jurisdictional
purposes. The resulting increase in diversity of citizenship cases
would conflict with the basic goal of the 1958 amendment to reduce
the caseload of the federal courts."169 Consequently, courts have
found that unincorporated associations do not have the same needs
of avoiding local prejudice as a singular, corporate entity.
4. Exceptions to the Unincorporated Association Citizenship
Status
In 1933, the Supreme Court found that a particular unincorpo-
rated association had sufficient corporate characteristics to be
treated as a juridical entity.170 In Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 171
the Supreme Court seemed to make an exception to the tradition of
common law citizenship regarding corporate and unincorporated
associations.' 72 This case involved a situation where the people of
Puerto Rico brought suit against Russell & Co., a sociedad en co-
mandiata. 7 3 Individual members of the sociedad, none of whom
were from Puerto Rico, removed the case to the United States Dis-
trict Court for Puerto Rico on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 174
The petitioners, People of Puerto Rico, made a motion to remand
168. McCormack, supra note 3, at 520.
169. Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3630, at 696.
170. A juridical or legal entity is "an entity.., who has sufficient existence in
legal contemplation that it can function legally, be sued or sue." Black's Law Dic-
tionary 893-94 (6th ed. 1990). See, e.g., Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d
314, 318 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that Lloyd's argued that the syndicates were not
juridical entities and thus could not be classified as an association because they
had no capacity to sue or be sued).
171. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
172. See Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 681-82 (1889) (holding that only
incorporated associations are to be treated as legal persons and all others are to be
deemed partnerships and thus unincorporated associations).
173. See Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 477 (1933).' A sociedad en
comandita is a unique, hybrid entity organized under the laws of Puerto Rico. See
McCormack, supra note 3, at 525 (describing the sociedad and citing to Mesa Oper-
ating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238, 240 (5th
Cir. 1986) for the coinage of the term "hybrid," which is used to describe an entity
with corporate and association-type qualities like Lloyd's).
174. See Russell & Co., 288 U.S. at 477.
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back to the district court of San Juan, Puerto Rico averring that
complete diversity did not exist, and thus, the federal court was
without proper jurisdiction because the sociedad is a juridical en-
tity organized under the laws of Puerto Rico. 175
The court agreed with the petitioners and found the organiza-
tion to be a juridical entity by analyzing substance over form.176
Specifically, the court went beyond how the organization had la-
beled itself and considered the substance of the organization. 177 In
the end, the court imported a corporate citizenship upon an unin-
corporated association. 178 The court held that although the organ-
ization was not like a "traditional" corporation, it was consistently
treated as a juridical entity because of the corporate characteris-
tics that it possessed.179 As a result, the court could not justify
treating the organization as a non-juridical entity simply because
it did not fully resemble a "corporation." 80 However, "the holding
in Russell should be confined to the peculiar type of association in-
volved in that case and the legal system under which it was organ-
ized. Indeed, most of the subsequent cases limited Russell to its
facts."18 Therefore, although the Russell case may be viewed as
the first of many exceptions, the courts have emphatically stated
175. See id. at 478-79; see also id. at 448-49 (citing to various sections of the
Civil Code of Puerto Rico (1930) and the Code of Commerce (1930) which created
the sociedad and gives the sociedad the rights and privileges it exercises).
176. The Court looked at the organic statute which created the sociedad, the
function and abilities of the sociedad, as well as its structure, creation and so forth.
See id. at 481 (describing the Court's analysis beyond the basic assertion by the
sociedad itself that it comprised an unincorporated association). The substance is
the actual function and composition of the relationship and the form is the general
structure and appearance.
177. See id. at 179-82 (discussing the treatment of the sociedad under the Code
of Puerto Rico and the extent of liability and participation of each of the sociedad
members).
178. See id. at 481.
179. The corporate characteristics of the sociedad include, amongst other ele-
ments, the ability to "contract, own property and transact business, sue and be
sued in its own name and right." Id.
180. See id. at 481-82 (describing that the sociedad en comandita had corporate
attributes that made it a juridical person). The Court added that it would not
justify allowing nonresidents of Puerto Rico to form a juridical entity in Puerto
Rico, yet be insulated from controversies arising under the local law. See id. at
482.
181. Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3630, at 692 (citing Brocki v. American Ex-
press Co., 279 F.2d 785 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871, 81 S.Ct. 113
(1960); Stein v. American Fed'n, 183 F. Supp. 99 (M.D. Tenn. 1960)).
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(and implied) that Russell only applies to other federal cases in-
volving a sociedad., 8 2
The Russell case helps demonstrate that nothing can super-
sede the prerequisite of complete diversity in federal diversity ju-
risdiction cases.18 3 The requirement of complete diversity is a
prerequisite even when state law and Federal Rule 17(b)184 allow
an association to sue and be sued as a corporate entity. 18 For ex-
ample, if a state allows a limited partnership to be defined as a
"quasi-corporation" and declares this particular entity to be a citi-
zen of a particular state, this will not automatically entitle the en-
tity to be treated as a corporation for federal diversity purposes 186
Therefore, regardless of whether an entity holds itself out as an
unincorporated association or a corporation, it will be character-
ized as a corporation for the purpose of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion only if it contains the requisite characteristics.18 7
182. See United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, 382 U.S. 145 (1965) (holding that the
labor union will not be defined similar to a corporation on the basis of Russell
because Russell is limited to its specific facts).
183. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806).
184. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), entitled "Parties Plaintiff and De-
fendant; Capacity to Sue or Be Sued," states:
The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative
capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the individ-
ual's domicile. The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be
determined by the law under which it was organized. In all other cases
capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in
which the district court is held, except (1) that a partnership or other un-
incorporated association, which has no capacity by the law of such state,
may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or
against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of
the United States, and (2) that the capacity of a receiver appointed by a
court of the United States to sue or be sued in a court of the United States
is governed by Title 28, U.S.C. Sections 754 and 959(a).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
185. See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3630, at 690.
186. See, e.g., Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900) (decid-
ing that although a limited partnership was defined under an act by the General
Assembly of Pennsylvania as a "quasi-corporation" or a "new artificial person" and
was doing business under a firm name, it would not be treated as a corporation for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction).
187. Similarly, if an entity declares itself to be a corporation, but is in sub-
stance an unincorporated association, it will be denied access to federal courts
without complete diversity of all its members. See Wright et al., supra note 18,
§ 3630, at 689-90 (presenting that complete diversity is required regardless of an
organization's treatment by a state).
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In sum, courts have reluctantly expanded the term "citizen"
and have bestowed upon corporations and insurance companies a
citizenship status.'88 Thus, the determination of citizenship sta-
tus for unique organizations such as Lloyd's is of particular impor-
tance for future cases. The complete, legal appearance of the
association must be considered when balancing the needs of the
association to access the federal courts with the purpose of federal
diversity jurisdiction and the general reluctance to broaden diver-
sity jurisdiction.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHAT Is THE PROPER CITIZENSHIP OF
LLOYD's OF LONDON?
In 1994, the Sixth Circuit was faced with a new challenge: de-
termining the citizenship of an entity which could not conveniently
be categorized as a corporation or an unincorporated association
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit, in Certain
Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, England v. Layne, 18 9
held that a Lloyd's insurance syndicate acquires the citizenship of
strictly the agent of the syndicate. 19° However, since 1994, the
Seventh Circuit has also had an opportunity to decide the same
issue.' 91 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held that a syndicate
procures the citizenship of each of its subscribing members. 192 Ac-
cordingly, these two decisions embody the current circuit split as to
the proper citizenship of Lloyd's.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits each analyze the agency rela-
tionship'9 3 which exists within Lloyd's. More specifically, the
courts focus directly on the syndicates and the relationship be-
188. See supra part II.B.2 "The Emergence of Corporations as Citizens"
(describing the involved, well reasoned process the Supreme Court and Congress
endured to ultimately grant a corporation and insurers citizenship).
189. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26
F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1994).
190. See id. at 43.
191. See Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1998).
192. See id. at 317.
193. Agency is "[a] relationship between two persons ... where one (the agent)
may act on behalf of the other (the principal) and bind the principal by words and
actions .... Or relationship where one person confides the management of some
affair, to be transacted on his account, to other party"). Black's Law Dictionary 62
(6th ed. 1990).
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tween the underwriter and the Names.194 Under the liability prin-
ciples of agency, courts differ as to whether a Lloyd's syndicate
falls into a category of a corporation or an unincorporated associa-
tion. 195 Each court, however, comes to its respective conclusion by
applying the real parties in interest test to determine whether
complete diversity exists. 196
A. Sixth Circuit
Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, England
v. Layne19 7 is the first case to provide guidance as to the proper
assessment of the citizenship of a Lloyd's syndicate. In this case,
the underwriters successfully brought suit against the insured in
the United States District Court, Eastern District of Tennessee, to
deny insurance coverage on the basis of fraud. 198 The defendants
(citizens of Tennessee) appealed, arguing that members of the
Lloyd's syndicate were also citizens of Tennessee and thus diver-
sity was destroyed and the district court did not properly procure
jurisdiction. 199 The underwriters urged that diversity existed be-
cause they (the underwriters solely) were citizens of the United
Kingdom and the defendants were citizens of Tennessee. 2°° The
underwriters argued the irrelevancy of whether or not some of the
194. See Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 317 (6th Cir. 1994);
Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26 F.3d 39, 43
(7th Cir. 1998).
195. When an entity is before the court in diversity jurisdiction cases, the court
has two options: 1) consider the entity as a corporation or 2) as an unincorporated
association. Therefore, if it determines the syndicate to be an unincorporated asso-
ciation, then it must consider the citizenship of all members comprising the partic-
ular Lloyd's syndicate. Whereas, if it determines it to be like a corporation, then it
would only consider the citizenship of the lead underwriter (as with a corporation
the courts only consider the corporation's principal place of business and state of
incorporation).
196. See Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 318-19 (6th Cir.
1994); Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26 F.3d
39, 42-43 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a), (b) (embodying the real
party in interest rule); Wright et aL, supra note 18, § 3606, at 409-15 (stating also
that a court cannot ignore the citizenship of an "indispensable" party who is not
yet a party to the action); see also part IV.A (which describes the real parties in
interest test).
197. 26 F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1994).
198. See id. at 41.
199. See id.
200. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3) which would confer diversity
jurisdiction).
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members of the syndicate were from Tennessee because for diver-
sity purposes, only the citizenship of the underwriters themselves
was pertinent.20 1 The court agreed with the underwriters by
utilizing the real parties in interest test to determine the proper
parties.20 2 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit held that the underwrit-
ers-and not all the Names comprising the syndicate-were the
real parties in interest.20 3 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the
syndicate takes on the citizenship of only the agent (underwriter)
because it did not find the syndicate analogous to previous, tradi-
tionally defined unincorporated associations. 20 4
Primarily, the court distinguished this particular syndicate
from generally accepted unincorporated associations on the basis
that the principals were undisclosed. 20 5 The court came to this de-
termination for two reasons. First, the court discussed the 1990
Supreme Court decision in Carden v. Arkoma Associates2 6-which
held that a limited partnership is considered an unincorporated as-
201. See id.
202. See id. at 42, 43.
203. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26
F.3d 39, 42-43 (6th Cir. 1994) (making reference to the "real party to the contro-
versy" test and citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 n.1 (1990)).
204. The "traditional" common law rule is that when a Congressional statute is
silent regarding the citizenship of a certain organization, then the courts must
apply the unincorporated association label and the norm is to treat the organiza-
tion as a partnership. See Carden, 494 U.S. at 195-96; see also Indiana Gas Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying this common law rule to
the syndicates before it). The Sixth Circuit also came to the conclusion that the
"traditional" rules of an unincorporated association do not apply to Lloyd's, and
that only the underwriter is a real party in interest, by applying the substantive
law of Tennessee. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v.
Layne, 26 F.3d 39, 43 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) for the proposition that "the governing substantive law in diversity actions
is state law, and in this case that is Tennessee law"). Applying Tennessee law the
court found that the investor principals (Names) had no substantive right to relief.
See id. Rather, the court found that the agent, underwriter, was liable on the in-
surance contract and thus interpreted Tennessee law to deem only the agent as a
real party in interest. See id.
205. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26
F.3d 39, 43 (6th Cir. 1994). An undisclosed principal is "a principal whose identity
is unknown by a third person, and the third person has no knowledge that the
agent is acting in an agency capacity at the time the contract is made." Black's
Law Dictionary 1527 (6th ed. 1990). This is different from principal in that a prin-
cipal "is one who has permitted or directed another to act. . . such that the acts of
the agent become binding on the principal." Id. at 1192.
206. 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
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sociation 2° 7 but distinguished the Carden holding as it applied to
the Lloyd's syndicate. 20 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit identified
that Lloyd's has the appearance of a limited partnership. 209 Nev-
ertheless, by analyzing substance over form, it ultimately deter-
mined that one of the crucial elements which exists in a limited
partnership does not exist in the Lloyd's syndicate-the element of
limited liability.2 10 As a result, the court found that Lloyd's was
similar to an agency rather than a partnership.2 11 The court found
an agent-undisclosed principal relationship due to the fact that the
underwriters present themselves as the only liable members on
the contract because no syndicates or Names were mentioned any-
where in the policy.2 12
Second, the court concluded that a syndicate was comparable
to a corporation for diversity jurisdiction purposes because the un-
derwriters are appointed as agents and under Tennessee law,
agents are fully liable for the undisclosed principals.2 13 The court
made particular reference to the fact that the insured chose to sue
the agents, but could have sued the agent (the underwriter, where
in this case there was more than one underwriter so there were
numerous "agents") or principals (the Names).2 14 The insurer here
chose to sue the one person who represented and was liable for the
group, as opposed to the numerous individuals who made up the
group.21 5 Consequently, the court held that only the underwriter
207. See Carden., 494 U.S. at 190. The Carden court came to this 5-4 decision
by adhering to the "oft-repeated rule that diversity jurisdiction in a suit by or
against the entity depends on the citizenship of 'all the members.'" Id. at 195
(quoting Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889)).
208. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26
F.3d 39, 42-43 (6th Cir. 1994).
209. See id. at 42.
210. See id. (citing Daly v. Lime Street Underwriting Agencies Ltd., 2 FTLR
277, 279 (Q.B. 1987)).
211. See id. at 43.
212. See id.
213. See id. The court asserts that "Tennessee follows the venerable common
law rule" and refers to Restatement (Second) of Agency §322 (1958).
214. See id. (quoting Holt v. American Progressive Life Ins. Co. 731 S.W.2d
923, 925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)).
215. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26
F.3d 39, 43 (6th Cir. 1994).
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could be deemed a real party in interest under the Tennessee law
of agency and undisclosed principals.216
B. District Court Decisions
As the Sixth Circuit was deciding Certain Interested Under-
writers, the District Court of Maine was tackling the same issue.
In Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Certain Member Co. of the Institute of
London Underwriters,217 the defendants (underwriters of Lloyd's)
attempted to remove to federal district court an action for declara-
tory and monetary relief by a Maine corporation, Bath Iron Works
Corporation (hereinafter "BIW"). 218 The defendants argued that
their presence in federal court was proper because only the active
underwriters, who act as the agents for the Names, and not all of
the syndicate members (i.e. the Names), constitute real parties in
interest.219 Like the Sixth Circuit, the Bath Iron Works court ap-
plied a real parties in interest test.220 But this court reached an
opposite conclusion, holding that the potential for liability should
determine who is a proper defendant, and not merely the identifi-
cation of an agency type relationship. 221 To this end, the court
noted that it could not ignore the Names as real parties because
their liability was certain considering it was their inventory and
personal assets which ultimately funded any settlement or judg-
ment against the Lloyd's syndicate. 222 The court confirmed its con-
clusion by mentioning that BIW did not sue the syndicate itself as
in Certain Interested Underwriters, but instead sued the "active"
216. See id. at 43 (asserting that Tennessee follows the same rule as that of the
common law and thus referred to the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 322 (1958)
which states that: "An agent purporting to act upon his own account, but in fact
making a contract on account of an undisclosed principal, is a party to the con-
tract"). Id.
217. 870 F. Supp. 3 (D. Me. 1994).
218. See id. at 4.
219. See id. at 5.
220. See id. 6-7.
221. See id. at 7.
222. See id. The court seems to be confused in that it refers to Names and
underwriters as one in the same. See id. at 7 n.8. However, an underwriter is a
Name, but not all Names are underwriters. See supra part I.B.1,3 (describing the
terms Name and underwriter). Regardless, this does not affect the court's analysis
because it tends to distinguish Names and underwriters by using "active" Names
or underwriters and "non-active" Names or underwriters. Furthermore, it's analy-
sis is not affected because all Names, as underwriters or not, encounter unlimited
liability-which is the heart of the court's decision.
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and "non-active" underwriters. 223 However, the court notes that if
BIW had chosen to sue the syndicate, it would necessarily utilize a
Carden analysis. 224 Therefore, because Carden mandates that the
citizenship of unincorporated associations must be determined by
looking at the citizenship of each member, the court mentions that
it would define a Lloyd's syndicate as such and consider the citi-
zenship of each member comprising the syndicate. 226
The court, therefore, found that the Names could not be con-
sidered merely nominal or formal parties in the litigation because
of their potential liability.22 6 Being considered a formal or nominal
party would effectively render the parties insignificant and thus
not real parties in interest.227 Rather, because each member
(Names and underwriters) is potentially liable to the insured
under the policy, he constitutes a real party in interest, regardless
of whether or not he is a "disclosed" principal. 228 Consequently,
the United States District Court remanded the case back to the
Maine Superior Court because of a lack of diversity.229 The United
States District Court concluded, unlike the Sixth Circuit in Certain
Interested Underwriters, that Lloyd's citizenship is determined by
considering the citizenship of all underwriters and Names.230
223. See Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Certain Member Cos. of the Institute of
London Underwriters, 870 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D. Me. 1994). Again, the court here
seems to use the term "non-active" underwriters as a reference for a Name.
224. See id; see also supra part III.A. for a discussion of the Carden analysis.
225. See id.
226. See id; see also Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182
(1924) (holding that the presence of a formal or nominal party may be ignored in
determining jurisdiction; thus the formal and nominal parties do not equal real
parties in interest). A formal or nominal party is one who is brought into litigation
"not because he is immediately liable in damages ... but because his connection
with the subject matter is such that the plaintiffs action would be defective, under
the technical rules of practice, if he were not joined." Black's Law Dictionary 1049
(6th ed. 1990).
227. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a), (b) (discussing that the only parties that can sue
and be sued are those which are "real parties in interest"); see also Wright et al.,
supra note 18, § 3606, at 416 (noting that a "nominal" party thus does not have the
right to sue or represent a beneficial interest); infra part IV.A. (explaining real
parties in interest).
228. See Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Certain Member Cos. of the Institute, 870 F.
Supp. 3, 8 (D. Ct. Me. 1994).
229. See id.
230. See id. at 7.
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Subsequently, in 1996, a New York district court in Humm v.
Lombard World Trade, Inc. 23 1 also determined that the citizenship
of each Name comprising the syndicate was an essential part of
qualifying citizenship in a lawsuit against the underwriter or syn-
dicate.232 Humm involved a situation where Lombard World
Trade, Inc. (Lombard), the defendant, obtained a marine cargo in-
surance policy with Lloyd's.233 The plaintiff, Timothy Maxwell
Humm ("Humm"), was a lead underwriter of the insurance policy
who sued Lombard on behalf of himself and all interested under-
writers.234 Lombard ultimately brought a counterclaim against
Humm.235 As counterclaim defendants, he joined Lowndes Lam-
bert Cargo Limited ("Lowndes Lambert"), the insurance broker,
and John Does 1 through 50, representing all of the Names who
had potential liability under the policy.23 6 Lombard was a Dela-
ware corporation with its principal place of business in New
York.23 7 The underwriters of Lloyd's were, for the most part, Brit-
ish citizens, although some of the Names were citizens of New
York.238 Lloyd's argued that the underwriters represented the in-
terests of the members, and thus, the underwriters were the only
real parties in interest.239 Lombard, rather, contended that all of
the Names constituted real parties because they had several liabil-
ity on the policy.240
The Humm court employed a slightly different rationale than
that of the court in Bath Iron Works. 241 In fact, it adopted an
agency analysis similar to that of the Sixth Circuit in Certain In-
231. 916 F. Supp 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
232. See id. at 297, 98.
233. See id. at 292.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 292-93.
237. See Humm v. Lombard World Trade, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 291, 294 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
238. See id. at 293.
239. See id. at 294.
240. See id. Several liability refers to the notion that each member individually
pledged to be liable--opposed to a theory ofjoint liability where collectively mem-
bers agree to be liable.
241. Although the court Humm used a different rationale than that in Bath
Iron Works, Humm ultimately squared with Bath Iron Works; because the Names
are severally liable, they are real parties in interest. See id. at 297, 298.
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terested Underwriters.242 However, the Humm court concluded
that the Names were not undisclosed principals243 because
although their identity was not known, the Names' presence was
known.244 Thus, the Humm court considered the Names to be
"partially disclosed" principals.2 45 The court arrived at this conclu-
sion because although the Names were not specifically named on
the contract, any reasonable person would know that the contract
included the Names and not only the agent underwriter.246
The Humm court differentiated Certain Interested Underwrit-
ers on the premise that a Name does not amount to an undisclosed
principal.247 Agency law does not require that the name of a prin-
cipal be disclosed for a principal to be liable.248 Rather, the iden-
tity of the principal, in that the insured knows that the principals
exists, is what is important. 249 A principal cannot be undisclosed,
and thus the agent cannot purportedly be acting in his own inter-
est, if a third party can reasonably presume or deduce that the
agent is representing others. The court concluded that any reason-
able person would infer, as a result of the notoriety of Lloyd's, that
the underwriter does not and cannot possibly insure the policy on
his own. 250 As a result, the court found that to concentrate solely
on the citizenship of the underwriting agents is unfair and illogical
because they are not the only liable parties on the policy.25 1 The
court certified this rationale on the basis that the Names are sever-
ally liable for the syndicates' risks under the policy.25 2
The Humm court also distinguished Certain Interested Under-
writers to the extent that the plaintiffs in Certain Interested Un-
242. See id. at 295-98 (discussing the Sixth Circuit analysis and conclusion and
employing its own examination of agency).
243. See Humm v. Lombard World Trade, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 291, 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
244. See id. at 295-96.
245. See id. at 295.
246. See id. at 295-96 (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 4 (1958)
which in sum states that situations arise where a reasonable person could con-
clude that the agent was acting for a principal which makes the principals liable).
247. See id.
248. See Humin v. Lombard World Trade, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 291, 295-96
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 4 (1958)).
249. See id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 4 (1958) (citing Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency § 9 comment d (1958))).
250. See id. at 296.
251. See id. at 297-98.
252. See id.
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derwriters chose to sue only the underwriting agent, whereas the
defendant's counterclaim in Humm was against all of the princi-
pals. This counterclaim served to hold all of the potentially liable
people accountable. The Humm court, however, like the Maine
District Court's decision in Bath Iron Works, held that even if the
plaintiffs had only sued the agent, "such an election does not sup-
port the finding that the Names are no longer liable on the Pol-
icy."26 3 Therefore, had the facts been different, each member
comprising the syndicate group would still be considered for citi-
zenship purposes.254 The fact that each Name was potentially lia-
ble on the policy garners him with a substantive interest in the
litigation.25 5 To this end, each Name must be considered a real
party in interest and the syndicate regarded as an unincorporated
association for citizenship purposes. 25 6
Ultimately, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction because
there was no diversity since at least one of the Names was from
New York. The plaintiff, Lombard World Trade, Inc., was also
from New York and thus the case was subsequently dismissed.25 7
The court proclaimed that its conclusion was consistent with the
reasoning of Carden v. Arkoma:258 if an entity is not a corporation,
then it is deemed an unincorporated association with no legal iden-
tity and each member's citizenship is therefore relevant.25 9
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit stands alone in its decision to
treat Lloyd's as a citizen according to the citizenship of only the
syndicate's lead agent, opposed to all of the syndicate's members.
The result of the Sixth Circuit's holding is to grant Lloyd's citizen-
ship similar to that of a corporation.260 Consequently, Lloyd's has
253. Id. at 296.
254. See Humm v. Lombard World Trade, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 291, 296 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
255. See id. at 297 (finding that Humm, the underwriter, did not present any
evidence that he owned all of the substantive rights to the Policy at issue and
therefore because each Name is liable for any loss under the Policy he has substan-
tive rights in the litigation).
256. See id. at 297-98.
257. See id. at 298-99 (noting also that jurisdiction is frustrated because of a
failure to comply with the jurisdictional amount required of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 of
$50,000). Note that the minimum claim requirement for federal diversity jurisdic-
tion in now $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. HI 1997).
258. See id. at 299.
259. See id.
260. Citizenship is assessed as that similar to a corporation because only the
lead underwriters citizenship will be viewed for diversity purposes. A corporation
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greater access to the federal courts because diversity will rarely be
an issue. 26 1 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
Lloyd's should be treated as an unincorporated association for citi-
zenship purposes.
C. Seventh Circuit
Finally, in 1998, the Seventh Circuit decided the issue of citi-
zenship in diversity jurisdiction cases for Lloyd's syndicates. In In-
diana Gas Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 26 2 Lloyd's, the defendant
and insurer of the plaintiff, refused to pay for some of the plaintiffs
cleanup costs. 26 3 As a result, the plaintiff brought suit against
Lloyd's and other insurers in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Indiana.264 The plaintiff appealed to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals after most of the claims were ter-
minated or settled in the defendant's favor.265 However, prior to
deciding the substantive issues, the court first needed to attribute
a citizenship status to Lloyd's.26 The court followed the two previ-
ous decisions by the Maine and New York district courts267 and
also, potentially, will only be a citizen of one or two states. Opposed to an unincor-
porated association where the citizenship of all the members counts and thus the
potential for diversity is rare.
261. Diversity will rarely be an issue because a corporation is only deemed to
be a citizen of the state where it is incorporated and the state where it maintains
its principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. II 1997).
262. 141 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1998).
263. See id. at 315.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 315-16. The district court found in defendant's favor and Indi-
ana Gas appealed. Before proceeding, the Seventh Circuit attempted to ensure
that subject matter jurisdiction existed and "inquired at oral argument whether
... any of the names in any of the syndicates was a citizen of Indiana." Id. at 316.
As a result, the court found it necessary to "decide whether the citizenship of the
underwriters is the citizenship of every name, or only of the active underwriter
who acts as the managing agent." Id. at 317.
267. Although only Maine (see Bath Iron Works, 870 F. Supp. 3) and New York
federal district courts (see Humm, 916 F. Supp. 291) were discussed here. See also
Bell & Assocs. v. Lloyd's Underwriters, No. 92 Civ. 5249, 1998 WL 274346
(S.D.N.Y.) (holding that the Lloyd's syndicate group is a citizen of eabh state where
each Name is a citizen); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Aldridge, 906 F. Supp. 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that they syndicate is a citizen of the state(s) where each
investor, Name, is a citizen); Lowsley-Williams v. N. River Ins. Co., 884 F. Supp.
166 (D.N.J.1995) (finding that since the parties stipulated that the Names were
personally liable on the Policies, they were real parties in interest); and Trans-
america Corp. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 884 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1995) (finding that
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held that the Lloyd's syndicate was a citizen of all of the jurisdic-
tions in which the Names, as well as the underwriters, were
citizens. 268
The Seventh Circuit, like the New York district court in
Humm, focused on the fact that each Name faced unlimited liabil-
ity, and therefore, the syndicate is similar in structure to a part-
nership which would qualify it as an unincorporated
association. 26 9 The court noted that the Sixth Circuit's holding
and rationale in Certain Interested Underwriters was inaccur-
ate. 2 70 The Sixth Circuit's agency interpretation could not be con-
doned by the Seventh Circuit because although an agent may ap-
pear to be liable for an undisclosed principal, an agent and
undisclosed principal are still bound by the contract to which he
subscribes.271
In particular, the court mentioned the general rule of agency
law that as long as the agent is acting within the scope of his
agreement with the principal, then the principal(s) will be bound
by the agent's actions.272 "The proposition that an agent for an
undisclosed principal is liable does not imply that the undisclosed
principal is not bound by the contract .... When the principal's
interests are affected by the litigation, the principal's citizenship
counts even if the agent is the sole litigant."273 Therefore, the
court found the language in the underwriting agent's employment
contract-stating that he has the right to pursue litigation-to be
irrelevant because all of the Names are necessary parties whose
citizenship is considered because their interests are affected by the
litigation.274 Consequently, the court determined that the lan-
syndicates are citizens of each state as all of the Names as the distinction between
the active underwriters and Names is unnecessary).
268. See Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1998).
269. See id. at 316. This reasoning is unlike that employed by the Sixth Circuit
in Certain Interested Underwriters who only considered a limited partnership and
not a general partnership.
270. See id. at 318-19.
271. See id. at 319.
272. See id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 186, 302 (1958)).
273. Id.
274. See Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1998)
(referring to English law which protects Name's liability by asserting that they
cannot be sued by insureds); see also supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text
(describing that a state law's characterization of an organization will not upset the
federal analysis).
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guage of the contract could not defeat the fact that the Names were
liable on the policy and thus real parties in interest.2 75
In reaching it's decision, the court was also mindful of
Supreme Court precedent regarding the reluctance to extend di-
versity jurisdiction by judicial interpretation. 276 The court fol-
lowed the general rule that when Congressional statutes are silent
regarding a new organization, the court must follow the common
law rule that all unincorporated associations are treated as a part-
nership. 277 The court here reasons that precedent, in dealing with
the citizenship of unincorporated associations, demands this
conclusion. 278
The Seventh Circuit rule is distinctly different from the Sixth
Circuit's holding. The Seventh Circuit adhered to the generally ac-
cepted standard for all unincorporated associations and held that a
Lloyd's syndicate possesses the citizenship of all of its members.
Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit would not allow the
case to turn on whether or not the principal was undisclosed, be-
cause under an agency theory, all parties are real parties in inter-
est. Thus, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits are now split as to who
is a real party in interest in an action involving a Lloyd's syndicate
group. In sum, courts have assessed a Lloyd's syndicate's citizen-
ship by 1) strictly utilizing only the under-writing agents who rep-
resent the syndicates or 2) looking at all of the Names who make
up the syndicates. 279
275. See id.
276. See id. at 317-18. The court followed the general rule of Carden v. Arkoma
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990), and discussed Puerto Rico v. Russell stating that the
approach in these two cases echoed a strong reluctance of the Court to extend the
interpretation of diversity jurisdiction. See id. (finding that although underwriting
syndicates are unusual organizations, the established rule is that any organization
other than a corporation will be treated like a partnership for diversity purposes).
277. "Carden articulated a general rule: every association of a common-law ju-
risdiction other than a corporation is to be treated like a partnership." Indiana
Gas Co., 141 F.3d at 317.
278. See id. at 317-18 (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990);
Puerto Rico v. Russell, 288 U.S. 476 (1933)).
279. See, e.g., Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v.
Layne, 26 F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1994); Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Certain Member Cos.
of the Institute, 870 F. Supp. 3 (D. Me. 1994); Humm v. Lombard World Trade,
Inc., 916 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y 1996); Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d
314 (7th Cir. 1998).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF LLOYD'S AS IT RELATES TO REAL PARTIES IN
INTEREST, THE AGENCY THEORY AND
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
The courts agree that an agency relationship exists within the
Lloyd's syndicate. Disagreement exists, however, over which mem-
bers of a Lloyd's syndicate constitute a real party in interest. This
is important because, as explained previously,280 a determination
of whether federal courts properly procure jurisdiction in a section
1332 diversity action, depends on which citizenship attaches to
each party.28 ' To reach a rational conclusion, it is most logical to
analyze the substance of the relationship over its form.28 2 This is
significant because a court cannot assume that Lloyd's is actually
organized as the type of entity it declares itself to be. For example,
if Lloyd's proclaims itself to be a partnership, then a court must
critically analyze the composition and function of Lloyd's to deter-
mine if it does indeed have all of the requisite elements to consti-
tute a partnership. Accordingly, this section explains "real parties
in interest." It will then focus on the agency relationship that ex-
ists within Lloyd's to explain which members should qualify as a
real party in interest. Part IV.C. then examines, in light of the
agency relationship, whether or not Lloyd's, as an unincorporated
association, qualifies as an exception to the section 1332 citizen-
ship assessment.
A. Real Parties in Interest
Assessing real parties in interest 28 3 is a primary step to deter-
mine which party's citizenship a court will consider in diversity ju-
risdiction actions and ultimately, whether complete diversity
280. See supra part B.A., B.1 (explaining the purpose and requirements of di-
versity jurisdiction).
281. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (embodying the requirement
that each plaintiffs citizenship must be diverse from each defendant's).
282. The substance is the actual function and composition of the relationship
and the form is the general structure and appearance.
283. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) and (b) (embodying the rule to define a real party
in interest) The real party in interest is the party who "has the legal right under
the applicable substantive law to enforce the claim in question." Black's Law Dic-
tionary 1264 (6th ed. 1990). A determination of the appropriate real parties in
interest has historically been defined by way of case law. See Chapman v. Barney,
129 U.S. 677 (1889); Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). Also, Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
28 U.S.C. § 1332 aid in determining real parties in interest.
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exists.284 Only parties who have the right to bring forth or main-
tain a substantive claim are deemed to have a "real interest" in the
action and thus will be considered for diversity purposes. Other-
wise, the parties will be treated as merely formal or nominal par-
ties and their citizenship will not matter285 because only a real
party in interest has the ability to sue or be sued. 286 In applying
this test, the courts must look to the state law287 to determine
whether the parties, and most importantly which members of the
parties, are entitled to enforce the right asserted as diverse
citizens.288
Once a party is deemed a real party in interest in the action,
the court must then determine the citizenship of the particular
person or entity. In cases involving individuals, corporations or
unincorporated associations, the courts can apply the well-estab-
lished citizenship rules with relative ease. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 em-
bodies the rule for diversity of citizenship and establishes that
individuals are considered citizens of the state in which they are
domiciled. 28 9 Corporations, pursuant to 1332(c), are deemed citi-
zens of both the state of its incorporation and the state in which it
maintains its principal place of business. 29° In contrast, an unin-
corporated association takes on the citizenship of each member of
284. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 n.1 (1990); Bath Iron
Works Corp. v. Certain Member Cos. of the Institute, 870 F. Supp. 3, 5 (D. Me.
1994); Humm v. Lombard World Trade, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 291, 294-95 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (citing Navarro Savings Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460-61 (1980); Carden,
494 U.S. at 188 n.1; and, Bath Iron Works, 870 F. Supp. at 5).
285. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a), (b) (discussing that the only parties that can sue
and be sued are those which are "real parties in interest"); see also Humn v. Lom-
bard World Trade, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 291,295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Navarro Sav-
ings Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460-61 (1980); Carden, 494 U.S. at 188 n.1; and,
Bath Iron Works, 870 F. Supp. at 5)).
286. See id.; see also Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3606, at 416 (noting that a
"nominal party thus does not have the right to sue or represent a beneficial
interest).
287. State law is the governing substantive law in diversity actions.
288. Therefore Certain Interested Underwriters involved Tennessee law as the
substantive law. See Certain Interested Underwriters, at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v.
Layne, 26 F.3d 39, 43 (6th Cir. 1994). Indiana Gas Co. involved Indiana state law
as the governing substantive law. See Indiana Gas Co., Inc. v. Layne, 141 F.3d 314
(7th Cir. 1998).
289. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
290. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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its organization. 291 The dilemma, however, is that the courts are
unable to attach a citizenship to Lloyd's of London because of an
inability to determine which parties constitute "real parties in
interest."
B. Agency Relationship Theory
It is necessary to identify Lloyd's method of operation to deter-
mine which parties within Lloyd's constitute "real parties in inter-
est." The relationship of the Underwriting agent and the Name is
distinctly an agency relationship. 292 An agency relationship is cre-
ated by the consent of two or more persons, 293 particularly "when
one person manifests an intention that another shall act in his be-
half and the other person consents to represent him."294 The
Lloyd's syndicate has traditionally operated as an agency. The
Names and underwriters form an agency when the Name agrees to
let the lead underwriter subscribe to a risk on his behalf. Although
the Names have unlimited liability, they do not have the power or
authority to underwrite risks on their own.29 5 Therefore, as mem-
bers of the syndicate, the Names consent to and rely on Lead Un-
derwriting members to enter into insurance "contracts" on their
behalf.29 At this point, each member of the syndicate is exposed
to potential liability. 297 The underwriter, therefore, acts as an
agent in representing the interests of the Names-as the princi-
pals-to third parties.
The underwriters are bound to the Names, and subsequently
to third parties, by way of a contract. Consequently, one may be
compelled to apply the law of contracts to such relationships. In
291. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195 (1990) (holding that all
unincorporated associations citizenship is that of all of its members).
292. See John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An
Overview, in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business 1, 2 (John W. Pratt
& Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1991) (stating that "[wihenever one individual de-
pends on the action of another, an agency relationship arises").
293. See Harold Gill Reuschlein & William A. Gregory, The Law of Agency and
Partnership 32 (2d ed. 1990); see also Pratt & Zeckhanser, supra note 292, at 17
(noting that "the agent and principal are merely two (or more) individuals (or orga-
nizations) in some sort of explicit or implicit contractual relationship").
294. Reuschlein & Gregory, supra note 293, at 32.
295. See supra part I.B.1 (describing a Name and the extent of a Name's liabil-
ity, power and responsibility).
296. See id.
297. See supra note 30.
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general, because the law of contracts binds only the contracting
parties,298 it may be argued-as it was by the Sixth Circuit in Cer-
tain Interested Underwriters-that since the underwriter is the
only contracting party, he is the only one liable.299 However, con-
tract law, as it applies to agency relationships, is unique in that
"the principal becomes a party to a contract made on his behalf by
his agent only because of a concept peculiar to agency which ig-
nores the rules of contract."300 In this regard, courts have unani-
mously held that an undisclosed principal is a necessary and
proper party.30 ' "[Blecause of the relation of agency, it has been
invariably held that the undisclosed principal can sue and be sued
upon the contract made on his account, if it was properly made for
him by an agent."30 2 As a result, under this analysis, the undis-
closed principal has liability which exists in spite of the rules of
contract.303
Contract law as it applies to agency contradicts the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision in Certain Interested Underwriters. Although the
Certain Interested Underwriters court relied on the substantive
law of Tennessee30 4 and general agency theory,30 5 its analysis was
incomplete because it only examined certain agency principles. 3°6
The court interpreted section 322 of the Restatement 307 to mean
298. See Reuschlein & Gregory, supra note 293, at 15.
299. See id.
300. Id. at 163; see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 186 (1958) (stating
that an undisclosed principal, as well as the agent, is liable upon a contract made
on his account by an agent acting within his powers). The undisclosed principal is
equally as liable, under rules of agency law, despite the fact that the third party
did not know of his existence.
301. See Reuschlein & Gregory, supra note 293, at 164 n.3 (citing Wahyou v.
Kiernan, 302 P.2d 638 (1956); Armstrong v. Blackader, 118 So. 2d 854 (Fla. App.
1960); and, C.A. Karlan Furniture Co. v. Richardson, 324 P.2d 180 (1958) for cases
where courts have held undisclosed principals a party to litigation).
302. Id. at 15; see also Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law
with Contract Theory, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1969 (1987) (discussing that standard con-
tract theories are unable to explain the law of undisclosed agency).
303. See Reuschlein & Gregory, supra note 293, at 161.
304. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26
F.3d 39, 43 (6th Cir. 1994).
305. See id. at 43, 44.
306. See id. at 43 (stating that Tennessee follows the agency rule embodied
solely in section 322 of the Restatement Second).
307. See id. "IAn agent purporting to act upon his own account, but in fact
making a contract on account of an undisclosed principal, is a party to the con-
tract.'" Id. (quoting, in part, Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 322 (1958)).
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that a party who deals with an agent representing an undisclosed
principal "may sue either the principal or the agent, but not
both."308 The court held that since the defendants sued only the
underwriters in their counterclaim, the citizenship of the Names
was irrelevant. 30 9 Thus, the court disregarded the fact that the
Names must be considered real parties because they had a sub-
stantive interest in the litigation.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Indiana Gas Co. employed
a more thorough analysis. For example, it examined other perti-
nent sections of the Restatement 3 10 which clarify the agency the-
ory when undisclosed principals are involved.3 1' When
considering the Restatement (Second) of Agency in its aggregate, it
is apparent that an undisclosed principal is equally as liable as a
disclosed principal on a contract entered into by the agent.3 12 "In
determining whether a disclosed or partially disclosed principal is
a party to a contract we look to the manifestations of the agent and
third persons to one another."313 Therefore, unless the principal of
the agency relationship is specifically excluded by the terms of the
agency agreement, then he is a party to the transaction. 3 14 In the
situations involving Lloyd's, the Names were never excluded from
any of the contracts made on their behalves. Similarly, the third
parties with whom the underwriters contracted were well aware,
because of Lloyd's history and the exorbitant insurance policies,
that the underwriter was not acting on his own behalf, but for the
entire syndicate. The Seventh Circuit, therefore, recognized that
even if the Names were not particularly identified in the litigation,
they were necessary parties who needed to be considered in the
action.
The fact that the syndicate may take on the appearance of a
partnership, or any other organization, is irrelevant; the Name,
308. Id. at 43 (citing Holt v. American Progressive Ins. Co., 731 S.W.2d 923,
925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)) (emphasis added).
309. See id. at 43, 44.
310. See Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1998)
(stating that "[wihen the principal's interests are affected by the litigation, the
principal's citizenship counts even if the agent is the sole litigant"); see also Re-
statement (Second) of Agency §§ 186, 302 (1958).
311. See id. (citing primarily to sections 186 and 302 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency).
312. See Reuschlein & Gregory, supra note 293, at 161.
313. Id. at 164.
314. See id.
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undisclosed or not, is liable under agency theory and thus is a real
party in interest. 315 "If inability to sue [the Names] personally
means that their interests are not affected by the litigation, it
would follow that no insured could rely on their promise or use
their wealth to support the insurance agreement."316 Conse-
quently, the fact that Names cannot be sued directly under English
law3 17 is irrelevant to the determination that, in American courts,
they are real parties in interest partly because their interests are
affected by the litigation.318 Due to the fact that the Names pro-
vide all of the assets which insure a policy and are subsequently
severally liable on any losses, they maintain substantive interests
in any litigation against their syndicate. Furthermore, it would be
unfair to place the burden upon an insured, or any other person
suing a syndicate, to discover the identities of all of the Names in
order to sue each one of them. It is therefore logical that the
Names cannot be merely nominal or formal parties but must be
considered as real parties in interest whose citizenship is
significant.
Accordingly, it is not a requirement for a third party to choose
to sue either the Name or the underwriter. This specification by
the Sixth Circuit places the duty on the insured to sue the Names,
even if they were undisclosed principals, if the insured wants the
Names to be a part of the litigation.3 19 Of course, one may choose
to sue the agent or the principals alone, but for the purpose of fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction, regardless of who is sued, all syndicate
members are potentially liable. 320 This precondition implicated by
Certain Interested Underwriters serves to preclude indispensable
parties. It also allows parties to circumvent the diversity require-
315. See id. at 15 (noting that an undisclosed principal can sue and be sued on
a contract made on his behalf which would therefore qualify him as having a sub-
stantive interest and thus a real party to a controversy).
316. Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1998).
317. See id. (noting that Lloyd's is organized under English law and that
Names cannot be sued directly by the insureds under English law).
318. See id.
319. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26
F.3d 39, 43, 44 (6th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that although an agent may make a
contract on behalf of undisclosed principals, it is still the insured's duty to sue the
principals separately if he wants them to be a part of the litigation).
320. See supra part I.B.1, 2 (describing the Names and syndicates, the role of
the Names within the syndicate and stating that all Names are potentially liable
for any losses because it is their wealth which endorses all of the deals).
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ment by carefully structuring their litigation to include only di-
verse parties. The Sixth Circuit's holding, therefore, conflicts with
the history and purpose of diversity jurisdiction.
Although Lloyd's may urge the courts to accept it as a corpora-
tion, the relation of agency exists within the organization. There-
fore, on this basic principle alone, a disclosed or undisclosed
principal can "sue and be sued upon a contract made on his ac-
count, if it was properly made for him by an agent."321 Conse-
quently, a Lloyd's syndicate should be assessed citizenship as an
unincorporated association, whereby each member's citizenship
will be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes, unless there
is some reason for Lloyd's to be an exception to that rule.
C. Lloyd's as an Unincorporated Association
Although it has been determined that a Lloyd's syndicate is
organized under agency principles, it is necessary to assess
whether this organization's citizenship is to be defined as that of
an unincorporated association or whether it qualifies as an excep-
tion to that standard. An entity is only deemed to be incorporated
when it has a legal personality so complete that it should be
treated as its own, distinct entity.322 One may argue that Lloyd's
has some characteristics of a corporation. 323 As a result, the con-
tention can be made that the partnership type arrangement that
exists within Lloyd's-although traditionally like that of an unin-
corporated association-should be treated similarly to a corpora-
tion. However, Lloyd's does not qualify as a corporation per se
because it is not legally incorporated and thus without a state of
incorporation to attach citizenship. Similarly, regardless of Lloyd's
corporate characteristics, it operates daily under the principles of
agency. Lloyd's does not have a legal personality so complete to
operate as its own entity because each Name must rely on an un-
derwriter to transact any business on its behalf, and because
321. Reuschlein & Gregory, supra note 293, at 15.
322. See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3630, at 693.
323. For instance, a Lloyd's syndicate is commonly known as "Lloyd's of
London." More than one syndicate within Lloyd's often insures a risk and
although each syndicate is separate per se, they all operate out of the Lime Street
headquarters. The insurance policy is obtained by way of a Lloyd's broker who
finds the syndicate to insure it.
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"Lloyd's" as an entity does not accept liability for any of the syndi-
cates' losses.
It may still be argued, as it successfully was in front of the
Sixth Circuit, that Lloyd's should be treated as a corporation for
diversity purposes. This is a compelling argument because Lloyd's
falls neither under the rubric of a "traditional" unincorporated as-
sociation,324 nor as a standard, formal "corporation." Accordingly,
in reaching a conclusion regarding Lloyd's citizenship, each of the
aforementioned courts3 2 5 were guided by Carden v. Arkoma Associ-
ates. Carden set some guidelines for qualifying an entity as an
"unincorporated association"326 and established that:
[flor purposes of the statute authorizing the federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship (28
U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)), (1) diversity jurisdiction in a suit by or
against an artificial entity other than a corporation depends
on the citizenship of all the members of the entity; and (2) a
court may not determine the citizenship of a limited partner
solely by reference to the citizenship of its general partners,
without regard to the citizenship of its limited partners.327
Most courts, including the Seventh Circuit and the various
district courts previously discussed, 328 came to the conclusion that
Carden reaffirmed that every entity without an independently es-
324. See supra part II.B.3 (outlining all of the entities deemed to be "traditional
unincorporated associations" by the courts).
325. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26
F.3d 39, 41-42 (6th Cir. 1994); Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 317
(7th Cir. 1998).
326. Carden specifically held that a partnership, be it general or limited, along
with any other entity that does not have corporate characteristics, has the compo-
sition of an unincorporated association. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S.
185 (1990).
327. Walter N. Jones, Jr., Determination of Citizenship of Unincorporated As-
sociations, For Federal Diversity of Citizenship Purposes, in Actions By or Against
Such Associations, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 849, 100 (Supp. 1999) (emphasis added) (citing
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990)); see also Chapman v. Barney, 129
U.S. 677 (1889) (holding for the first time that unincorporated associations have no
citizenship status of their own for federal diversity purposes).
328. See Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1998);
Humm v. Lombard World Trade, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 291, 294-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Certain Member Cos. of the Institute, 870 F. Supp. 3, 5
(D. Me. 1994).
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tablished, incorporated identity is to be treated as an unincorpo-
rated association.329
To this end, another argument can be made that Lloyd's,
although not incorporated, is its own entity for which an exception
should be made to treat it analogous to a corporation for diversity
purposes. The United States Supreme Court discussed this gen-
eral idea in United Steelworkers of America v. R.H. Bouligny,
Inc.330 In this case, the defendant was a labor union demanding
treatment as a citizen for purposes of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion.331 The labor union removed the case to federal court, con-
tending that diversity jurisdiction existed because it was a citizen
of Pennsylvania and the defendant was a North Carolina corpora-
tion.33 2 The North Carolina corporation argued that diversity did
not exist because some labor union members were citizens of North
Carolina and therefore diversity was destroyed.333
But the District Court retained jurisdiction. The District
Judge noted 'a trend to treat unincorporated associations in
the same manner as corporations and to treat them as citi-
zens of the state wherein the principal office is located.' Di-
vining 'no common sense reason for treating an
unincorporated national labor union different from a corpora-
tion,' he declined to follow what he styled 'the poorer rea-
soned but more firmly established rule' of Chapman v.
Barney, 129 U.S. 677. 33 4
However, on appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision that diversity existed.336 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision. 336 The Supreme Court took this opportunity to con-
329. See Indiana Gas Co., 141 F.3d at 317; Humm, 916 F. Supp. at 294; Bath
Iron Works Corp., 870 F. Supp. at 5. Compare Certain Interested Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26 F.3d 39, 41 (7th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing
Carden on the premise that a Lloyd's syndicate has a separate legal identity to
qualify as a corporation).
330. 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
331. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (stating that a labor union is
categorized as an unincorporated association and thus assessed no independent
citizenship status).
332. United Steelworkers of America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 146
(1965).
333. See id.
334. Id. at 146.
335. See id. at 146-47.
336. See id. at 147.
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firm the general rule regarding unincorporated associations that
responsibility lies with the legislature, and not the judicial branch,
to make exceptions which would qualify an unincorporated associ-
ation as a separate entity.337 Ultimately, the court reluctantly ap-
plied the rule,338 but also noted "that the contrary position to the
general rule is 'appealing' and has 'considerable merit.' ' 339
The court also discussed that it would not be appropriate to
characterize the union as an "exception" to the common law tradi-
tion of unincorporated associations, like the sociedad en comandita
in People of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. 340 The sociedad, a crea-
ture of Puerto Rican civil law, was characterized as an entity hav-
ing its own citizenship for diversity purposes because the local
Puerto Rican law endowed the sociedad with "sufficient corporate
characteristics so that it is just and sensible to treat them as corpo-
rations."34 1 The union, in United Steelworkers v. Bouligny,342
challenged the Supreme Court with the argument that it should
also be regarded as its own distinct entity.343 However, the Court
affirmed that the ruling in Russell did not breach the doctrine of
unincorporated associations because:
in the Russell Case the problem presented was that of fitting
an exotic creation of the civil law, the sociedad en comandita,
into a federal scheme which knew it not ... because, in the
tradition of civil law, as expressed in the Code of Puerto Rico,
the sociedad was consistently regarded as a juridical
person.344
As a result, the Supreme Court held that the union was an
unincorporated association and would be considered as such for
the purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction.345
337. See id. at 153.
338. See United Steelworkers of America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145,
150-51 (1965).
339. Jones, supra note 327, at 852.
340. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
341. Jones, supra note 327, at 854 (quoting United Steelworkers, 382 U.S. at
150).
342. 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
343. See United Steelworkers of America, 382 U.S. at 147.
344. See Jones, supra note 327, at 861-62 (citing United Steelworkers of
America, 382 U.S. at 151).
345. See United Steelworkers of America, 382 U.S. at 149-50 (holding that it
will not treat "an unincorporated labor union as a citizen for purposes of federal
diversity jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of its members").
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Therefore, a similar exception, as that of the sociedad, cannot
be applied to Lloyd's. Unlike Puerto Rican law, British law does
not import any corporate characteristics upon Lloyd's, thus treat-
ing it as its own juridical entity.346 British law, moreover, does not
recognize Lloyd's syndicates as legal entities.3 7 To this end,
Lloyd's does not fall into any of the current "exceptions" and no
further exceptions should be made because it would upset the
structure of diversity jurisdiction and open the doors for future,
undefined entities to also be categorized as corporations for diver-
sity purposes. Accordingly, although there is a current circuit split
regarding the citizenship status of Lloyd's for section 1332 diver-
sity jurisdiction purposes, the Bouligny decision suggests: 1) the
Supreme Court's unwillingness to increase the right of entry to the
federal courts, 348 2) it's deference to Congress to qualify an unin-
corporated association as its own entity,349 and 3) its adherence to
precedent to qualify an undefined entity as an unincorporated
association.350
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Bouligny, the Sev-
enth Circuit in Indiana Gas Co. used a proper analysis to deter-
mine Lloyd's citizenship as an unincorporated association when it
focused on the substance over the form of the Lloyd's syndicate.351
The court recognized that British law3 5 2 permits the underwriters
to sue or be sued, but it also analyzed the manner in which Lloyd's
346. See Humm v. Lombard World Trade, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 291,299 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (indicating that its conclusion to treat Lloyd's as an unincorporated associa-
tion is consistent with Carden v. Arkoma Assocs. because none of the syndicates is
incorporated and because British law does not recognize them as such).
347. See Barry Ostrager & Mary Kay Vyskocil, Modern Reinsurance Law and
Practice 750 PLY Comm 159, 180 (1997).
348. See id.
349. See id. at 150-51 (stating that "[wie are of the view that these arguments
... are addressed to the inappropriate forum, and that pleas for extension of the
diversity jurisdiction to hitherto uncovered broad categories of litigants ought to be
made to the Congress and not to the courts").
350. See id. at 147-51 (describing the major cases which established the current
rule for assessment of citizenship of a corporation versus an unincorporated
association).
351. See Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 318-19(7th Cir. 1998)
(discussing that in form Lloyd's underwriters may appear to be liable because they
resemble a trustee or represent "undisclosed principals," but in substance the un-
derwriters are clearly representing interests of the Names who, even if undis-
closed, are potentially liable).
352. British law is mentioned here because Lloyd's, in general, is governed by
British law. However, as mentioned earlier, the substantive law which applies in
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is organized.353 The Seventh Circuit quite accurately noted that
Lloyd's is essentially a hybrid because "the underwriting syndi-
cates are unusual organizations, with some properties of general
partnerships, some of limited partnerships, some of joint stock
companies, and some of trusts."354 The court's hybrid evaluation,
however, did not allow for Lloyd's to be assessed a similar citizen-
ship status as that of a corporation. 355 Primarily, this is because
all of the organizations mentioned as part of the hybrid are actu-
ally unincorporated associations with different citizenship statuses
than corporations, in that each of their member's citizenship
"counts" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.356 Lloyd's citizen-
ship, therefore, should be evaluated like any other unincorporated
association. Lloyd's has the general unincorporated traits which
distinguish it from a juridical entity.357 In particular, Lloyd's pos-
sesses the qualities of a unified membership with unlimited liabil-
ity of its members. Thus, in substance, Lloyd's is an
unincorporated association.
More importantly, precedent demands that Lloyd's be distin-
guished as an unincorporated association. 358 The history of diver-
sity jurisdiction demonstrates that the federal court system is
unable to accommodate a greater access to the federal forum. Fed-
eral courts have limited jurisdiction. Unnecessary exceptions to
common law precedent would therefore serve to defeat the central
purpose of diversity jurisdiction: to allow a fair forum in a lawsuit
federal diversity cases is the law of the state in which the action is brought or
where the court presides. See id.
353. See id.
354. Id. at 317.
355. See id.
356. See supra note 160-67 and accompanying text (giving examples of all types
of entities that, for citizenship purposes, have been defined as unincorporated
associations).
357. See supra part H.B.3 (describing the traits which qualify an unincorpo-
rated association as such).
358. See, e.g., Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889) (pionedring the rule
that all entities, aside from corporations, are assessed citizenship in accordance to
each of its members); United Steelworkers of America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382
U.S. 145 (1965) (finding that a union is an unincorporated association partially
because Congress has not deemed it to be otherwise); Carden v. Arkoma Assocs.,
494 U.S. 185 (1990) (finding that all organizations, besides legal corporations, are
deemed to be unincorporated associations for diversity purposes).
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amongst "diverse" peoples. 359 To this end, Lloyd's is still guaran-
teed impartiality and a "fair forum" if all of its members are com-
pletely diverse. Consequently, an analysis of a Lloyd's syndicate
as an unincorporated association would provide for consistency
with past decisions.36°
A consistent, bright line rule must be maintained. The corpo-
rate/noncorporate dichotomy that has developed over the years
must be applied strictly to future, undefined organizations. 36 ' To
date, the Supreme Court has applied the diversity rules for corpo-
rations and unincorporated associations consistently and has not
made exceptions of the sort that would need to be made here. The
structure of Lloyd's does not provide a substantial reason for an
exception. Lloyd's has the appearance of a corporation, yet it is
fundamentally an unincorporated association. Thus, to declare
Lloyd's as its own juridical entity would be to raise form above sub-
stance, contradicting a century long analysis of corporate and un-
incorporated associations. Although Lloyd's is a hybrid of
corporate and unincorporated characteristics, history begs that it's
citizenship be defined in line with unincorporated associations.
CONCLUSION
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a Lloyd's of London in-
surance syndicate should take on the citizenship of each of its sub-
scribing members. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits arrived at two
distinct conclusions when determining the proper real parties in
interest in litigation involving Lloyd's of London. The Sixth Cir-
cuit decided that because the principals appear to be undisclosed,
only the agent's citizenship is to be considered in a federal diver-
sity jurisdiction action.362 A second series of courts, including the
Seventh Circuit, held that because an agency relationship exists
359. See Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3611, at 509 (giving a history of diver-
sity jurisdiction and noting the general purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to pro-
vide a "fair forum"); see also part II.A. (explaining the history and purpose of
diversity jurisdiction).
360. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text (referring generally to the
Supreme Court's determination that other entities were to fall under the category
of unincorporated associations).
361. See McCormack, supra note 3, at 524 (referring to Chapman for the estab-
lishment of the bright line rule for the citizenship of corporations and unincorpo-
rated associations).
362. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Eng. v. Layne, 26
F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1994).
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within the syndicate, it is impossible to ignore the citizenship of all
the members. 36 The latter courts come to this conclusion regard-
less of whether the principals are considered disclosed or undis-
closed because each member had a substantive interest in the
litigation.364
By applying the real parties in interest test to a Lloyd's syndi-
cate, it is clear that all members of the syndicate have a substan-
tial interest in any litigation because all members of the syndicate
face potential liability. The general rule of unincorporated associa-
tions should be applied to a Lloyd's syndicate in federal diversity
jurisdiction cases because it has the primary characteristics of
other unincorporated associations. More importantly, general pre-
cedent, as well as the history and purpose of diversity jurisdiction,
demands this conclusion because diversity jurisdiction will no
longer serve its purpose of providing a "fair forum" if potentially
anyone has access. Moreover, courts should be reluctant to carve
out any "exceptions" because it is a legislature's role to alter the
statutory rules regarding citizenship and federal diversity
jurisdiction.
The proposed analysis-to treat a Lloyd's syndicate as an un-
incorporated association for 28 U.S.C. § 1332 diversity jurisdiction
purposes-is well suited to the needs of our federal court system:
to keep the access to the federal forum limited. An adverse posi-
tion is not judicious because it would create inconsistency amongst
general, unincorporated associations. Defining Lloyd's as a corpo-
ration for diversity purposes will encourage future, "undefined" en-
tities to access the federal courts on Lloyd's coat tails.
Additionally, current established unincorporated associa-tions will
petition the courts to reconsider them as corporations. Finally, re-
gardless of Lloyd's needs to access a fair forum, Lloyd's is organ-
ized under the principles of agency. Lloyd's does not conduct
business as a corporation; it has no corporate-like statutory birth,
363. See, e.g., Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 317 (7th Cir.
1998); Humm v. Lombard World Trade, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 291, 294 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Certain Member Cos. of the Institute, 870 F.
Supp. 3, 5 (D. Me. 1994).
364. See, e.g., Indiana Gas Co., 141 F.3d at 318, 319 (addressing, in particular,
the distinction made by the Sixth Circuit Certain Interested Underwriters court in
regards to undisclosed principals and found that because an agent for an undis-
closed principal is liable does not automatically mean that the undisclosed princi-
pal is released from liability).
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no limitations on the liability of its Names and is organized under
the principles of agency. These reasons mandate that Lloyd's be
identified as an unincorporated association for diversity purposes.
Melissa Coulombe Beauchesne

